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The
Millennium
Challenge
Account: Influencing Governance
in Developing Countries Through
Performance-Based Foreign Aid
ABSTRACT

The United States actively impacts the legal and political
environments of developing countries through the Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA).
This new approach to foreign
development aid presents both an incredible opportunity to
encourage good governance as well as a serious danger of U.S.
political agendas manipulating foreign aid to serve partisan
interests. The MCA should seek to develop a nonpartisan
strategy and focus primarily on pure rule of law, governance,
and political freedom indicators and programming in order to
maintain its current successes in improving the legal and policy
environment of developing countries competing for MCA
funding.
The direction and mandate of the Millennium Challenge
Account is important for several reasons. Although some might
consider the U.S. position on foreign aid to be a policy issue,
much of law encompasses policy and the two simply cannot be
divorced. The United States, in organizing U.S. foreign aid
around specific indicators of what it considers "good
governance," is necessarily impacting both the political and
legal environments of developing countries seeking results-based
foreign aid. Preliminarystudies have documented the tangible
impact of the MCA through the 'MCA Effect." Developing
countries are changing domestic laws and policies specifically in
order to qualify for MCA funding.
MCA funding
disbursements, or "Compacts," are also directly influencing
governance and the rule of law through various programming
mandates.
As this paper will demonstrate, it is vital that the MCA
develop a non-partisan approach to assessing countries and
allocating foreign aid in order to maintain fair and consistent
relationships with MCA countries.
Past experience has
demonstrated a tendency to use foreign aid for purposes of
political expediency-such as rewarding political allies or
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shoring up failed states-ratherthan for purely development or
poverty alleviation purposes. However, because the MCA has
been designed to reward good governance regardless of U.S.
interests, it is vital to maintain the separation between political
expediency and the development purposes of the MCA. This can
best be achieved by cultivating a more direct focus on
governance reform and the rule of law, both in determining aid
eligibility and in disbursingfunds for development initiatives.
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I. THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACT: RETHINKING U.S. FOREIGN AID

The ability of U.S. foreign aid to generate sustainable progress in
developing countries has increasingly come into question as poverty
and crisis continues to envelop much of the developing world. Despite
increased levels of foreign aid spending, key indicators in the late
1990's pointed to negative trends in economic development in the
poorest countries.1 For instance, despite the U.S. contributing $144
billion of foreign aid to 97 countries between 1980 and 2000, the
median gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in countries
receiving aid declined from $1,076 to $994.2 Former Secretary of
State Colin Powell emphasized the problem of poverty and potential
implications to the U.S. in his 2003 op-ed introducing the Millennium
Challenge Act to the American public:
Half the human race-3 billion people-still lives on less than $2 a day.
More than 1 billion do not have safe water to drink. Two billion lack
adequate sanitation. Another 2 billion have no electricity. These aren't
numbers but men, women and children who wake up each day to

1.
LARRY NoWELS, CONG. RES. SERV., FOREIGN AFF., DEF., & TRADE Div., THE
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT: CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF A NEW
FOREIGN AID INITIATIVE, at CRS-4 (2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents
organization/39340.pdf.
2.
Representative Jim Kolbe, Remarks to the Advisory Committee on
Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) (Oct. 9, 2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov
about_usaidlacvfa/acvfaKolberemarkl00802.pdf.

624

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL.. 42:621

hunger, disease and despair. Lifting humanity out of poverty is one of
the greatest moral challenges of the 21st century. And whether we, the
world's greatest democracy, rise to that challenge carries profound
3
implications for freedom, growth and security worldwide.

The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (the Act) attempted a
novel approach to the problem of ineffective U.S. foreign aid.
According to Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay of the World Bank,
"[the Act] represents a major policy shift by a donor in moving to an
allocation criteria which places governance issues center stage, and
which relies on highly transparent and objective empirical allocation
criteria. '4 The Act appropriates foreign aid to specific infrastructure
and economic development grants in developing countries showing a
commitment to (1) governing justly, (2) investing in their people, and
(3) encouraging economic freedom. 5 It allows eligible countries to
design their own programs based on internally identified priorities
6
and increases host-country ownership, accountability, and control.
The Act was passed by Congress and signed into law by President
George W. Bush on January 23, 2004. 7 It established an independent
government entity, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),
and created the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) as a
clearinghouse for "results-based" foreign aid.8 The original MCA,
funded with $1 billion in FY2004, has been allocated approximately

3.
Colin Powell, Op-Ed., The Millennium Challenge Account: "Aid for the
Enterprising," WASH. POST, June 10, 2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/ac2/wp-dyn/A37360-2003Jun9.
4.
Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Governance Indicators, Aid Allocation,
and the Millennium Challenge Account, pt. I (Dec. 2002) (Draft for Discussion, on file
with the World Bank), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbigovernance/pdfl
govindicatorsaid.pdf.
5.
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. § 7701(2) (2006).
6.
Millennium Challenge Corp., Programs and Activities, Millennium
Challenge Compacts, http://www.mcc.gov/programs/compacts.php (last visited Feb. 13,
2009) [hereinafter MCC Compacts]; Randall Wood, Incentives and Capacity at the
MCC (Apr. 13, 2006), http://therandymon.com/contentview/77/97/. Wood asserts the
following:
MCC expects countries to deal with the challenge of designing, developing, and
implementing their own programs to encourage a sense of ownership and to
ensure popular support for the upkeep and continued involvement in the
program. Too many projects completed with international funding have
crumbled afterwards due to the country's failure to maintain them, since
popular opinion holds that since the donor paid for the project, it is for all
practical purposes the donor's project, and the donor should pay again if the
project needs repair or additional funds.

Id.
7.
USAID OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP.,
SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS: APRIL 1, 2004-SEPTEMBER 30, 2004, at 1 (2004),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/mcc/mcc-sarcO4O9.pdf.
8.
22 U.S.C. § 7703 (2006); NOWELS, supra note 1, at CRS-2.
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$7.5 billion as of FY2008. 9 As an example of the importance of the
MCA in the foreign aid agenda, the MCA budget request constituted
the single greatest line item increase in the foreign operations budget
in FY2007. 10 However, funding allocations decreased substantially in
FY2008 and FY2009, placing the MCA in a precarious position in
light of shifting political power in Washington. 11
Although co-sponsored by Republicans and Democrats in
Congress, the Millennium Challenge Act was originally viewed by
some critics as a Republican-led alternative to USAID, which wasand continues to be-primarily controlled by Democrats. 12 Several
political and social factors led to the establishment of the MCA: the
failure of compassion-based foreign aid to achieve measurable
results; 13 research by prominent scholars on the benefits of
results/governance-based foreign aid; 14 the Millennium Development
Goals, adopted by 189 nations at the UN Millennium Summit in
September 2000; 15 the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the new Bush
security strategy; 16 and the desire of politicians in both the
Republican and Democratic parties to create a signature foreign aid
17
entity.
Now in its fourth year, the MCA faces serious pressure from a
number of sources seeking to change the organizational structure and

9.
S. REP. NO. 110-425, at 59 (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong-reports&docid=f:sr425.110.pdf
[hereinafter FY2009 SEN. APPROPRIATIONS COMM.]; CURT TARNOFF, CONG. RES. SERV.,
FOREIGN AFF., DEF., & TRADE Div., MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT, at CRS-24,

tbl.2 (2008), availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32427.pdf.
10.
KAYSIE BROWN ET AL., CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, US
DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT: EMERGING TRENDS IN

APPROPRIATIONS 1 (2006), available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc[MCA/USDev Aid_
MCA.pdf.
11.
TARNOFF, supra note 9, at CRS-24, tbl.2.
12.
Susanne Soederberg, American Empire and 'Excluded States': The
Millennium Challenge Account and the Shift to Pre-Emptive Development, 25 THIRD
WORLD Q. 279, 279 (2004) (calling the Millennium Challenge Account a "moment of
American empire").
13.
NOWELS, supra note 1, summary.
14.
See, e.g., Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth (World
Bank, Policy Research Department, Macroeconomics and Growth Division, Working
Paper No. 1777, 1997), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/02/24/000009265_3971023104021/Rendered/PDF/m
ulti-page.pdf.
15.
United Nations Development Programme, Millennium Development Goals,
http://www.undp.org/mdgfbasics.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
16.

THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 1-4, 21-23 (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/policy/nationallnss-020920.pdf

[hereinafter

NAT'L

SEC.

STRATEGY

20021.
17.
Niels C. Sorrells, State Department Bill Eyed as Vehicle for Foreign Aid:
LegislativeAnalysis, 61 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 409 (2003).
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Compounding these
programming mandates of the MCA.18
challenges is the recent change in political control in Washington,
D.C., following the 2008 Presidential election. With the MCA seen as
a Republican initiative and still in its infancy in terms of producing
tangible results, it will be a substantial struggle to maintain the
autonomy of the program and the consistent inflow of Congressional
funding needed to prove the success of the Millennium Challenge Act
concept. 19 In fact, the MCC is already feeling the pains of political
turmoil. A Democrat-controlled Senate Appropriations Committee
recommended FY2009 MCC funding at $254 million, a life-support
budget by any standard. 20 President Barack Obama's foreign policy
plan involves consolidating all foreign aid initiatives-including the
Millennium Challenge Account-under a "restructured, empowered,
and streamlined USAID.''21 This action would not necessarily

18.
The White House has not provided the MCA with its originally-promised
level of support. USAID--originally an ally of the Millennium Challenge Corporationnow feels threatened by the possibility of losing funding to the MCC and may be trying
to incorporate the MCC into its own monolithic bureaucratic structure. Foreign Affairs

Reform: Successes, Failures,and Next Steps: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lael Brainard, Chair, CSIS-Brookings
Task Force for Transforming U.S. Foreign Aid), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
testimony/2007/0612development.brainard.aspx. Non-government constituents such as
the Brookings Institute and the World Bank have been pressuring the MCC to change
its corporate structure as well as certain programming and monitoring objectives. Id.
Finally, Congressional budget appropriations to the MCA have fallen far short of
originally promised levels and jeopardize the success of the MCC in delivering the
tangible, positive results required for the future viability of the MCA. John Danilovich,
MCC CEO Ambassador, Overview Remarks at the Post-Board Public Outreach
Meeting (Sep. 14, 2007), available at http://www.mcc.gov/press/speeches/2007/speech091407-danilovichatpublicoutreach.php.
See James Fox & Lex Rieffel, Moving Toward Smarter Aid 1-2 (Brookings
19.
Institution, Policy Brief No. 145, 2005), availableat http://www.brookings.edu/-media/
in
decrease
(discussing
Files/rc/papers/2005/O8development-rieffelO2/pb145.pdf
funding for MCA in the years following its inception).
FY2009 SEN. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., supranote 9, at 61; Posting of Sheila
20.
Herrling to MCA Monitor Blog, http://blogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/archives/2008/07/
responsible-app.php (July 28, 2008, 11:00 EST) [hereinafter Herrling Post]. By way of
comparison, previous allocations had averages around $1 billion annually. TARNOFF,
supra note 9, at CRS-24 tbl.2. The Senate Appropriations Committee's
recommendation has been postponed until March 2009. Given economic conditions in
late 2008, Congress passed a Continuing Resolution ensuring the International Affairs
Budget (including the MCA) will be funded at FY2008 levels through the first part of
FY2009. U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, International Affairs Budget, FY2009
International Affairs Budget, http://www.usglc.org/index.php?option=comcontent&
task=view&id=168&Itemid=51 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
Obama for America, Strengthening Our Common Security Through
21.
Investing in Our Common Humanity: Barack Obama and Joe Biden's Strategy to
Promote Global Development and Democracy, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/
(last
FactSheetForeignPolicy-Democratization and_DevelopmentFINAL.pdf
visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Global Development Strategy]. Obama's
strategy includes the following goal:
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eliminate the programmatic importance of the MCA, but would
significantly limit its autonomy and its perception of independence
within the international aid community.
In spite of these challenges, the MCC has generated some
incredible success stories. A recent Harvard study found that MCA
candidate countries improve an average of 25% more than nonMore
candidate countries on development indicator scores. 22
23
importantly, countries continue that progress after receiving aid.
Madagascar, the first MCA Compact country, cut the cost of business
registration by almost 60%, leading to a 26% increase in new business
registrations in 2006.24
This Note will attempt to highlight ways in which the
Millennium Challenge Account, seen primarily as a policy initiative,
is actually influencing the regulatory environment and rule of law in
developing countries. It will also make a case for de-politicizing the
Millennium Challenge Corporation and focusing primarily on
governing justly and improving the rule of law in order to fairly and
impartially interact with MCA-eligible countries. This Note proceeds
in five parts. Part II briefly touches on the history of U.S. foreign aid
and the inception of the Millennium Challenge concept. Part III
describes the MCA process and analyzes it in the context of a
partisan framework. Part IV highlights the documented successes of
the MCA in enacting policy and legal reform, using empirical and
anecdotal evidence. This Part then addresses the most significant

Elevate, Streamline and Empower a 21st Century US Development Agency.
Barack Obama will lead an effort to modernize our foreign assistance policies,
Obama will coordinate and consolidate PEPFAR,
tools, and operations.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Middle East Partnership Initiative and
many foreign assistance programs currently housed in more than 20 executive
agencies into a restructured, empowered and streamlined USAID. He will
ensure that this agency has the highest caliber leadership and plays a central
role in the formulation and implementation of critical development and related
foreign policy strategies. An empowered and elevated agency should be more
nimble in the face of change and use tax dollars more responsibly. It is also
essential to ensuring that development is established and endures as a key
pillar of U.S. foreign policy.

Id.
22.
Doug Johnson & Tristan Zajonc, Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for
Good Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation 1 (Kennedy
School of Government, Working Paper Series, 2006), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=896293.
23.
See generally John J. Danilovich, Africa and the MCC: Partnerships for
Progress, A Legacy of Results, AFR. J., Winter 2008, at 28, 30, available at
http://www.africacncl.org/AfricaJournal/AJWINTER_2008.pdf (documenting programs
and success stories in eleven African countries receiving MCA Compacts).
24.
Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corp., International Finance
Corporation Report Identifies MCC Partner Countries as Leaders in Policy Reform
(Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.mca.gov/press/releases/2007/release-092707ifcreport.php.
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challenges faced by the MCA to date, namely the danger of
partisanship derailing the MCA's reform efforts and the implications
of allowing the MCA to become a politically polarized organization.
Part V suggests that the MCA focus primarily on regulatory and
governance initiatives in both its initial indicators and in Compact
development in order to avoid being overly influenced by either the
Republican or Democrat political agenda. It also outlines ways the
MCC can reinvent itself as an apolitical organization, utilizing the
World Bank as a reference. Part VI concludes.
II. THE HISTORY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: DISAPPOINTING RESULTS
AND NEW APPROACHES

Foreign monetary assistance to support struggling economies is
a well-established concept both in the United States and the
international community. 25
However, disappointing results and
increasing disenchantment with the established system of
distributing aid led to heated academic discourse in the 1990s on the
ability of foreign aid to generate sustainable results. 26
The
development debate culminated with a consensus on the Millennium
Development Goals in 2000.27 This strategy shift in the foreign aid
community coincided almost exactly with an increased U.S. national
interest in foreign development precipitated by the terrorist attacks
of September 11 and a growing sense of moral obligation by the
American public. 28 Finally, the political environment in the U.S. was
conducive to a major foreign aid initiative. 29 The primary aid agency,
USAID, was increasingly seen as having a strongly liberal agenda

25.
For instance, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were
both created during the Bretton Woods Agreement, following World War II. WORLD
BANK, A GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK 29 (Paul McClure ed., 2003). These two systems
were primarily designed to support struggling economies in the hopes of preventing
future conflict. Id.
26.
See, e.g., DAVID DOLLAR & LANT PRITCHETT, THE WORLD BANK, ASSESSING
AID: WHAT WORKS,
WHAT
DOESN'T, AND
WHY
(1998),
available at
http://books.google.comlbooks?hl=en&id=y3T6DnjxtlsC&dq=assessing+aid++what+wor
ks,+what+doesn%27t,+and+why&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=bLmBO3y2PH
&sig=AxMBGKeNX14shibOfrIWSsCca4&sa=X&oi=book result&resnum=2&ct=resultP
P1,Mlhttp://go.worldbank.org/HNXL7DP3JO. This research was primarily led by the
World Bank and is discussed below. The World Bank remains heavily involved with the
MCA by providing a majority of indicator data. Millennium Challenge Corporation,
Selection Indicators, http://www.mcc.gov/selection/indicators/index.php (last visited
Feb. 13, 2009). The World Bank Institute directly provides 5 of the 17 eligibility
indicators to the MCC. Id.
27.
United
Nations
Millennium
Development
Goals,
Background,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoalsfbkgd.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
28.
NAT'L SEC. STRATEGY 2002, supra note 16, at v, 21-22, 28.
29.
See id. at iii-v (extolling America's opportunity to fight terrorism by
spreading its values of freedom and democracy across the world).
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and the Bush Administration was interested in creating its own
30
signature foreign aid program.
A. Research and InternationalConsensus
to countries
The concept of tying aid disbursement
demonstrating good governance and measurable results is not a new
idea. However, prominent scholars in the late 1990s finally brought
the ineffectiveness of foreign aid to the forefront of the political
consciousness. In November 1998, the World Bank issued a study,
Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, assessing foreign
31
aid trends of the 1990s and their effectiveness in reducing poverty.
Dollar and Pritchett reach two important conclusions relevant to the
MCA. They first introduced the "selectivity" argument, suggesting
that supporting good institutions, laws, and policies was at least as
32
important in effective development assistance as providing capital.
The authors also argue that "there is no relation between financial
development assistance and economic growth, unless a differentiation
is made between countries exercising good governance and those who
33
Following Assessing Aid was a significant 1999 report by
do not."1
Paul Collier and David Dollar: Aid Allocation and Poverty
Reduction.34 Finally, in 2000, Craig Burnside and David Dollar
released a report, Aid, Policies, and Growth, revealing the results of
an intensive study that tracked aid spending and results in 56
developing countries from 1970-1993.3 5 The Burnside and Dollar
report identified key issues hindering the effectiveness of foreign aid

30.
'The president's decision to establish an independent agency was a clear
vote of no confidence in the 10,000-strong Agency for International Development
(USAID)." LAEL BRAINARD, THE OTHER WAR 2 (2003). Numerous commentators, both
supporters and critics, have recognized the MCA as Bush's "signature foreign aid
program." See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher & Paul Blustein, With New Leader, Foreign Aid
Program Is Taking Off: Millennium Challenge Will Give More Grants to Well-Governed
at
available
2006,
at
A15,
POST,
Jan.
31,
WASH.
Nations,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/30/AR2006013001415.html;
Joshua Kurlantzick, Bush's Fake Aid: The President's$5 Billion ProgramDoes More for
Foreign Banks Than the Needy, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/9448194Ibushs- fakeaid; Center for Global
the
MCC?,
is
Watching
Blog,
Who
MCA
Monitor
Development,
http:/Iblogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/archives/2005/06/who is-watching.php (June 20,
2005, 19:06 EST).
See DOLLAR & PRITCHETT, supra note 26.
31.
32.
Id. at 14, 37, 53, 117.
33.
Id. at 37.
34.
See Paul Collier & David Dollar, Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction, 46
EUR. ECON. REV. 1475 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.comscience?_ob=
MImg&_imagekey=B6V64-44B6VR3-1-32&_cdi=5804&_user=86629&_origbrowse&_
coverDate=09%2F30%2F2002&_sk=999539991&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkWb&md
5=27ca672965c9f8bdlcfcla3d3982d281&ie=/sdarticle.pdf.
Burnside & Dollar, supra note 14, at 2.
35.
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and provided a conceptual and empirical impetus for implementing
performance-based aid. 36 They found that aid has a positive impact
on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and
37
trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.
These reports severely undermined prior aid strategies of USAID and
other international aid programs-which focused more on
compassion- or crisis-based aid disbursements regardless of
governance-and paved the way for a performance-based program
38
such as the MCA.
Research on aid effectiveness coincided almost exactly with
increased international awareness of the necessity of foreign aid.
World leaders met at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000
and agreed to "a set of timebound and measurable goals and targets
for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental
degradation and discrimination against women. ' 39
The eight
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are to (1) eradicate extreme
poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3)
promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child
mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability;
and (8) develop a global partnership for development. 40
The
Millennium Declaration, signed on September 18, 2000, established
2015 as the date to achieve these goals and set forth various
41
implementation objectives and monitoring mechanisms.

36.
Id. at 5, 10-15, 33-34.
37.
Id. at Summary Findings.
38.
The seemingly conclusive findings of the Burnside and Dollar report have
recently been questioned by several prominent foreign aid scholars. See, e.g., William
Easterly et al., Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 774 (2004)
(using the same specifications with additional data points included, and finding an
insignificant relationship between policies and aid success). Burnside and Dollar
reexamined their initial conclusions using data from the 1990s and again concluded
that aid would be more effective in a sound policy environment. Craig Burnside &
David Dollar, Aid, Policies and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence (World Bank, Policy
Research Department, Macroeconomics and Growth Division, Working Paper No. 3251,
2004), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servletlWDSContentServerlWDSP/
IB12004/04/21/000009486_20040421103444[RenderedlPDF/wps325lAid.pdf. In a 2004
reply, Burnside and Dollar conclude, "aid directed to countries with good policies will
be more likely to produce good results." Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies,
and Growth: Reply, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 781, 784 (2004).
39.
Rajiv Fernando, Development: A New Breed of Hero, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Aug. 11, 2007, available at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38864.
40.
United Nations, Millennium Development Goals, supra note 27.
41.
Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2,
19, 31, U.N. Doc. AJRES/55/2
(Sept. 18, 2000). The MDGs are an important initiative in developing countries,
especially as the halfway point was reached in 2008. The Mail & Guardian,one of
South Africa's leading newspapers, in conjunction with the UN Millennium Campaign,
is conducting exclusive interviews with African presidents about their countries'
progress towards achieving the MDGs. The October 10, 2008, edition interviewed
Kenya's president and published a full-page report documenting Kenya's successes and
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The Millennium Development Goals clearly influenced the
creation of the MCA.4 2 The relationship between the MDGs and the
MCA can best be conceptualized as an ends-means relationship. The
Millennium Development Goals memorialize an international
commitment to achieving the eight most vital development objectives
by 2015, while the MCA represents the United States' primary
43
strategy to help achieve those objectives through economic growth.
B. Altruism, Obligation, and the "MoralImperative" in the
United States
Including all of the world's poor in an expanding circle of
development-and opportunity-is a moral imperative and one of the
44
top priorities of [U.S.] international policy.

This statement by President Bush in 2002 exemplified the
changing view toward foreign development assistance in the United

challenges in achieving the MDGs by 2015. Kenya Environmental & Political News
Weblog, Interview: President Kibaki Talks About MDG Progress in Kenya (Oct. 22,
2008), http://kenvironews.wordpress.com/2008/10/22/interview-president-kibaki-talksabout-mdg-progress-in-kenyal.
42.
President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Global
Development to the Inter-American Development Bank (Mar. 14, 2002), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020314-7.html.
President Bush said:
The needs of the developing world demand a new approach. In Monterrey,
we have a tremendous opportunity to begin acting on a new vision of
development. This new vision unleashes the potential of those who are poor,
instead of locking them into a cycle of dependence. This new vision looks
beyond arbitrary inputs from the rich, and demands tangible outcomes for the
poor.
America supports the international development goals in the U.N.
Millennium Declaration, and believes that these goals are a shared
responsibility of developed and developing countries. To make progress, we
must encourage nations and leaders to walk the hard road of political, legal and
economic reform, so all their people can benefit.
Id.
43.
Id. However, this unilateral, market-driven approach has not been fully
embraced by all those in the foreign aid community. See, e.g., JEFFREY SACHS, THE
END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 18, 73 (2005) (describing
economic development as a "ladder with higher rungs representing steps up the path of
economic well-being" and encouraging rich countries to "invest enough so that [the
poorest] countries can get their foot on the ladder"). Many development scholars have
taken issue in particular with the lack of multi-national collaborative aid efforts by the
United States. See, e.g., Steven Radelet, The Millennium Challenge Account:
Transforming US ForeignAssistance Policy?,11 AGENDA 53, 65-67 (2004), available at
http://epress.anu.edu.auagenda011/01/11.1-A-4.pdf (outlining the potential benefits of
a multilateral approach); see also Gene Sperling & Tom Hart, A Better Way to Fight
Global Poverty: Broadeningthe Millennium Challenge Account, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 9, 10
(Mar./Apr. 2003).
44.
NAT'L SEC. STRATEGY 2002, supranote 16, at 21.
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States. In addition to questioning the benefits of compassion- or
crisis-based foreign aid, by the late 1990's the foreign aid community
had renewed criticisms of the minimal amount of foreign aid donated
by major donors, particularly the U.S. 45 In 2001, U.S. Official
Development Assistance (ODA) totaled just under $11 billion,
amounting to 0.11% of U.S. gross national income (GNI), roughly
similar to GDP. 46 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) ranked the U.S. last of the twenty-two listed
donor governments in terms of aid disbursed as a percentage of
GNI. 47 These dismal statistics helped provide the incentive for
increased government attention to foreign aid in the early 2000s.
U.S. citizens also began more strongly supporting foreign aid funding,
leading to a more receptive policy environment in which to introduce
48
the MCA.
It should be noted that, despite increased foreign aid through the
MCA and other aid initiatives, lack of funding remains a serious
concern. The last official data, collected in 2005, reported the U.S.
ODA at $28 billion, the largest of all official donations by an
individual country. 49 However, this still accounts for only 0.22% of
GNI. 50 The OECD again ranked the U.S. poorly: 20 out of 22 listed
donor governments in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI. 51 The
Index of Global Philanthropy ultimately found that the U.S. was the
largest donor of foreign aid, but the majority of donations ($95.5
billion, or 79% of U.S. aid) came from private foundations,

45.
SACHS, supra note 43, at 1.
46.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Table 1: Net
Official Development Assistance Inflows in 2001, http:/lwww.oecd.orgldataoecd/42/3/
2087495.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
Id.
47.
However, President Bush's renewed focus on foreign aid was not embraced
48.
by all. See, e.g., Bob Barr, Op-Ed., U.S. Can Rest Easy; Vanuatu Is Secure-Put
Terrorism Funds Where They're Needed, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 19, 2006, available at
Barr, a former U.S.
http://www.bobbarr.org/default.asp?pt=newsdescr&RI=738.
Congressman, had this to say about the Millennium Challenge Act:
When you read about a program such as the "Millennium Challenge Account,"
launched by Bush in an apparent move to prove he has an even "kinder and
gentler" side than his father, and especially when you read in the laughable
description of the program that the president actually believes it will help in
the global war on terrorism, you really have to wonder what these folks in the
nation's capital are smoking.
Id.
49.

Jaroslaw 'Anders, United States Is Largest Donor of Foreign Aid, Report

Says, AMERICA.GOV, May 24, 2007, http://www.america.gov/stlwashfile-english/

2007/May/20070524165115zjsrednaO.2997553.html.
50.
Id.
Id.
51.
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corporations,
voluntary organizations,
52
organizations and individuals.

universities,

religious

C. National Security
Despite ongoing academic discourse on the necessity of foreign
aid, a substantial shift in U.S. foreign aid policy did not garner wide
political support until after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. Following the renewed focus on improving national security
and actively combating terrorism, development assistance became a
national imperative, laying the foundation for the introduction of the
MCA.
What is absolutely obvious is that foreign aid is not optional for the
United States. Its purposes are central to U.S. interests, values, and
well-being .... The economic, political, and social issues in developing
and transition countries, where well over 80 percent of the world's
population lives, are now among the most critical foreign policy and
53
national security challenges facing [the U.S.].

President Bush heavily canvassed for support of the MCA in his
first National Security Strategy report on September 20, 2002,
approximately twenty months after the beginning of his term and one
year after the September 11 terrorist attacks. 54 Indeed, his National
Security Strategy directly focused on the development of democracies
as protection against terrorism. 55 This idea found immediate support
as the entire nation was intently focused on protecting the United
States against further attacks by any possible means.
[Tihe United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the
benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the
hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every
corner of the world. The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that
weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our
national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people
into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and
drug cartels within their borders .... The aim of this strategy is to
56
help make the world not just safer but better.

In addition to advocating economic reform and free markets in
the developing countries, President Bush also encouraged civil
liberties and personal freedom: "America must stand firmly for the
nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on
the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal

52.
Id.
53.
CAROL LANCASTER & ANN VAN DUSEN, ORGANIZING U.S. FOREIGN AID:
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13 (2005).
54.
NAT'L SEC. STRATEGY 2002, supranote 16, at v, 7, 14, 16, 21, 31.
55.
Id. at v, 21-23.
56.
Id. at v.
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justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect
57
for private property.
D. Failureof PreviousForeignAid Vehicles and the Birth of MCA
Finally, the established foreign aid framework in the U.S. had
earned a reputation as dysfunctional and inefficient by the time Bush
was elected in 2000.58 The primary foreign aid vehicle, USAID, was
originally established to provide humanitarian support to developing
However, this
countries, regardless of political expediency. 5 9
mandate diminished over time as funds increasingly went to key
political allies. 60 Fiascos such as providing massive foreign aid to the
former government of Zaire substantially undermined faith in USAID
61
and served as an additional incentive to find a workable system.
Finally, USAID funds had become extremely earmarked, and a
substantial portion of USAID funding was being funneled into pet
projects and political interests of various congressmen. 62 As Roger
Bate stated in his article, The Trouble with USAID, "[o]ne reason the

Id. at 3.
57.
58.
See SAMUEL HALE BUTTERFIELD, U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID-AN HISTORIC
First: ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 218, 222 (2004)
(describing USAID's spending failures and lack of respect in Washington, D.C.).
59.
See USAID, About USAID, USAID History, http://www.usaid.gov/
aboutusaidlusaidhist.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (explaining that USAID was
established in the face of perceived failures of the overly bureaucratic foreign aid
programs that proceeded it and was meant to foster long-term economic stability
rather than to satisfy short-term political objectives).
60.
GORDON CRAWFORD, FOREIGN AID AND POLITICAL REFORM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY 41 (2001). Note
also that El Salvador was the third largest recipient of foreign aid in the early 1980s,
at the height of state-sponsored terrorism in the country. Id. Extraordinary foreign aid
assistance to Jordan provides a good example of foreign policy interests in
peacemaking and security trumping development goals. CAROL LANCASTER,
TRANSFORMING FOREIGN AID: UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 18
(2000), available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters-preview/
321/2iie2911.pdf.
61.
Sorrells, supra note 17 ("[fIn the case of Zaire, most of the aid ended up in
the Swiss bank accounts of former ruler Mobutu Sese Seko.... U.S. agencies are trying
still to track down how their money was diverted, years after Mobutu died in exile in
1997.").
62.
CAROL LANCASTER, AID TO AFRICA: SO MUCH TO Do, So LITLE DONE 92
(1999) (noting that USAID is often subjected to outside pressure from Congress,
including 'earmarks' in aid legislation or directives in legislative reports to USAID to
undertake particular types of activities at specified levels of funding"). Even USAID as
an organization has repeatedly expressed frustration with limitations placed upon it by
excessive Congressional earmarks. USAID, BUREAU FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM
COORDINATION, U.S. FOREIGN AID: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 8, 14, 25, 26 (2004), availableat http://www.usaid.gov/policy/pdabz3221.pdf.
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Millennium Challenge Corporation . . . exist[s] today is USAID's poor
'63
performance.
Practices of funding dictatorships, supporting corrupt leaders,
and using aid for political gain have understandably led to a great
deal of skepticism as to the ability of monetary assistance to affect
development in the poorest countries. 64 However, it is vital to
remember the myriad policy interests served by foreign aid.
Development and elimination of poverty has not been the primary
focus of past aid. 65 Indeed, these goals have historically been
secondary objectives to political expediency. 66 Thus, a blanket
assertion that U.S. foreign aid had "failed" prior to the introduction of
the MCA is not entirely accurate. A more accurate assessment may
be that U.S. foreign aid programs by the late 1990s were no longer
congruent with a renewed policy focus on sustainable long-term
development. The combination of timely academic research and
public education, the elevation of poverty alleviation to a national
security imperative, and the general disillusionment with USAID
provided a narrow window of political alignment and public support
through which the Millennium Challenge Concept could pass.
III.

ANALYZING THE

MCA

CONCEPT

The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 was presented to the
international community and the American public as a novel
approach to the problem of ineffective U.S. foreign aid. However,
while the MCA concept is fairly revolutionary in the field of U.S.
foreign aid, the underlying idea of aid selectivity is not unique to the
MCA. 67 Years of academic research and debate give credence to the
idea that "aid can be more effective in achieving development goals if
it is focused on nations with governments that are committed to

63.
Roger Bate, The Trouble with USAID, AM. INT., Summer 2006, at 113, 11920, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060523-Bate.pdf.
64.
See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE
WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD

(2006) (arguing that efforts undertaken by poor societies themselves-and not aid from
western countries-will eradicate poverty in those places).
65.
LANCASTER & VAN DUSEN, supra note 53, at 10-12.
66.
Id.
67.
See generally DOLLAR & PRITCHETT, supra note 26, at 117 ("Effective donor
agencies need to create internal mechanisms and incentives that foster selectivity and
that focus large-scale finance on developing countries with good policies."); Collier &
Dollar, supra note 34, at 1476 (explaining that aid is generally more effective in
countries with good policy); Burnside & Dollar, supra note 14 (arguing that foreign aid
is more effective when policy considerations in the receiving countries, rather than just
recipient interest, is considered by donors).
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establishing policies and institutions conducive to economic growth
68
and poverty reduction."
At first glance, the MCA concept closely tracks this principle of
results-driven aid, as evidenced by the MCA's selection criteria and
Compact development philosophy. However, a closer analysis reveals
significant partisan influence and the potential for aid selectivity
based on political expediency. 69 This Part will outline the core MCA
structure. It will then analyze that structure in context of a partisan
framework.
A. The Conceptual Model of the MCA
1.

Indicators and Country Selection
An objective and monitorable set of criteria for determining MCA
eligibility is highly desirable, both in terms of the process of aid
allocation, and also in terms of creating clear incentives among
70
potential recipients of aid.

The basic MCA structure is deceptively simple. The MCC, an
independent government corporation, allocates foreign aid through
Compacts and Threshold programs in developing countries
demonstrating a commitment to (1) ruling justly, (2) investing in
their people, and (3) encouraging economic freedom. 71 Each of the
three fundamental MCA "pillars" is measured by a series of
indicators: six indicators measure "Ruling Justly"; four indicators
measure "Investing in People"; and six indicators measure "Economic
Freedom." The following is a list of indicators along with the
72
independent source responsible for collecting assessment data:

68.
STEVEN RADELET, CHALLENGING FOREIGN AID: A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO
THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT 19 (2003).

See infra Part III.
69.
70.
Kaufmann & Kraay, supra note 4.
71.
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. § 7701(2) (2006). Potential
recipients compete within two income categories: (1) low income countries, with an
average GNI of less than $1,785 per capita, and (2) lower middle income countries,
with an average GNI between $1,786 and $3,705 per capita. Millennium Challenge
Countries,
Candidate
Step
1: Identify
Criteria,
Selection
Corporation,
http://www.mcc.gov/selection/stepOl-identify.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
72.
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, REPORT ON THE CRITERIA AND
METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT ASSISTANCE IN FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 3 (2008)

[hereinafter FY2009 MCC INDICATORS], available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/
Corporation,
Millennium Challenge
mcc-report-fy09-criteriaandmethodology.pdf;
Selection Indicators, supra note 26.
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FY2009 Eligibility Indicators

Ruling Justly
* Civil Liberties (Freedom House)
* Political Rights (Freedom House)
* Voice and Accountability (World Bank Institute)
* Government Effectiveness (World Bank Institute)
* Rule of Law (World Bank Institute)
* Control of Corruption (World Bank Institute)
Investing in People
* Immunization Rates (World Health Organization)
* Public Expenditure on Health (World Health Organization)
* Girls' Primary Education Completion Rate (UNESCO and
World Bank)
* Public Expenditure on Primary Education (UNESCO and
national sources)
Natural Resource Management (CIESIN and YCELP)
EncouragingEconomic Freedom
* Business Start-Up (IFC)
* Land Rights and Access (IFAD and IFC)
* Trade Policy (Heritage Foundation)
* Regulatory Quality (World Bank Institute)
* Inflation (IMF)
* Fiscal Policy (National Sources; cross-checked with IMF)
These indicators are unchanged from the FY2008 Eligibility
Indicators. 74 A range of third-party sources provide data used to
assess each indicator, the most heavily relied upon being the World
Bank Institute. 75 These databases in turn often draw from a broad
range of secondary sources. For instance, the World Bank Institute
index on "Voice and Accountability" is comprised of an index of up to
seventeen polls and surveys, each receiving a different weight based
on their estimated precision and country coverage. 76 This method of
collecting data from transparent and generally apolitical third party
sources reduces the risk of manipulation and increases the

73.

FY2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 3.

74.

Id. at 1.

75.
76.

Id.
Id.
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transparency and legitimacy of the entire MCA process. 7
Furthermore, using indicators which draw from large data pools
78
substantially decreases margins of error.
In order to be eligible for MCA funding, a candidate country
must (1) fall within per capita income limits; (2) score above the
median relative to other potentially eligible countries on at least half
the indicators in each category; (3) score above the median on the
"control of corruption" indicator; and (4) not be barred from receiving
U.S. aid (i.e., trade sanctions). 79 The MCA requires candidate
countries to overcome these hurdles "to ensure that resources are
channeled towards countries that are performing well in a variety of
dimensions of governance, and in which corruption especially is
80
relatively low."
Although the performance indicators are the primary method of
selecting countries for MCA funds, the MCC Board reserves the right
to designate countries as MCA-eligible even if they do not strictly
meet the indicator minimums, and to exclude countries that may
technically qualify. 8 ' The official MCA statement on its selection
process authorizes this discretion:
The indicators methodology will be the predominate basis for
determining which countries will be eligible for MCA assistance. In
addition, the Board may exercise discretion in evaluating and
translating the indicators into a final list of eligible countries. In this
respect, the Board may also consider whether any adjustments should
be made for data gaps, lags, trends, or other weaknesses in particular
indicators. Likewise, the Board may deem a country ineligible if it
performs substantially below average on any indicator and has not
82
taken appropriate measures to address this shortcoming.

77.
See RADELET, supra note 68, at 7 (describing the "public, transparent
process" used by the MCA to select countries to receive aid); Johnson & Zajonc, supra
note 22, at 10 (noting that the MCC collects data from "a number of independent
sources"); Kaufmann & Kraay, supra note 4, pts. II, 111.2 (explaining the importance of
relying on aggregate data from multiple sources).
78.
Kaufmann & Kraay, supra note 4, pt. 111.2. The relationship between
margins of error and the number of data sources is strongly negative. Id. For instance,
margins of error for countries with four or five data sources are half as large as
margins of error for countries with only one data source. Id.
79.
FY2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 2 (supporting requirements (1)
and (4)); Kaufmann & Kraay, supra note 4, at 45 (supporting requirements (2) and (3)).
Further, a country should not score disproportionately low on any one or more
indicators. FY 2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 2 ("A country may be
determined ineligible if it performs substantially below average on any indicator (i.e.
the bottom 25th percentile) and has not taken appropriate measures to address the
shortcoming.")
80.
Kaufmann & Kraay, supra note 4, pt. II.
81.
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, REPORT ON THE CRITERIA AND
METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT ASSISTANCE IN FY 2004, at 2 (2004), available at

http://www.mcc.gov/selection/reports/FY04_CriteriaMethodology.pdf.
82.
Id. at 2.
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Board discretion is necessary given the inconsistencies and margins
83
of error inherent in data collection in the developing world.
Numerous scholars have warned against the exclusive use of
indicators-particularly governance indicators, which can be quite
nebulous-in determining eligibility.8 4 For example, Kaufmann and
Kraay noted that
[g]overnance indicators have substantial margins of error, so that
special empirical scrutiny is needed for borderline cases .... These
substantial margins of error mean that for many countries it is difficult
to assign them with a high degree of confidence to a definitive
performance
category according to their estimated level of
85
governance.

In 2002, during the debate on the MCA eligibility methodology,
Kaufmann and Kraay found that 23 of 61 countries within the income
range of MCA eligibility-a full 37% of countries being consideredhad a statistically significant probability of being misclassified in the
"control of corruption" index.8 6 As the MCA and its sources have
refined their data collection and assessment methods over the last
four years,8 7 these significant margins have probably decreased to
some extent but remain a substantial concern. Thus, it is imperative
that a method of qualitative assessment in the form of Board
discretion is incorporated into the selection process.
2.

Funding Allocations-Compact
Programs

Development

and

Threshold

Countries who pass the minimum indicator thresholds and are
selected as candidate countries by the MCA Board of Directors may
then submit Compact proposals to the MCA.88 A Compact is "a multiyear agreement between the Millennium Challenge Corporation and
an eligible country to fund specific programs targeted at reducing
poverty and stimulating economic growth. '8 9 The MCC encourages
eligible countries to submit proposals based on the felt needs of the
country, as determined by the country's leaders in conjunction with
citizens, civil actors, and development partners. Compact proposals
must meet be:

83.
Id.
84.
See, e.g., RADELET, supra note 68, at 24; Kaufmann & Kraay, supra note 4,
pt. IV.
85.
Kaufmann & Kraay, supranote 4, pt. 111.1.
86.
Id. pt. 111.2.
87.
See FY2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 1 ("MCC reviews all of its
indicators and methodology annually to ensure that the best measures are being used
and, from time to time, recommends changes or refinements if MCC identifies better
methodologies, better indicators, or improved sources of data.").
88.
MCC Compacts, supra note 6.
89.
Id.
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* Developed in consultation with a country's citizens-including
women, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector;
e Able to measure both economic growth and poverty reduction;
a Implemented, managed and maintained by the country.

90

The MCA is unique among aid organizations in the level of control
given to recipient countries. 9 1 In fact, the eligible country has nearly
complete ownership in developing the Compact proposal, including
identifying specific ways in which the proposed program will reduce
poverty and stimulate economic growth. 9 2 A Ghanaian minister
summarized the Compact development process as follows, "Unlike
other traditional development assistance programs where the donor
proposes how funds are used, countries selected under the
Millennium Challenge... propose programs to receive funding ....
[It] is designed to allow developing countries to take ownership and
responsibility for funds provided by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation. '93 MCC works with the country to ensure the proposed
programs are reasonable, measurable, and attainable.
For those countries barely missing MCA eligibility, the
Threshold Program provides assistance in improving low indicators
scores and making the country competitive for MCA Compact
funding. 94 "A Threshold Program Agreement is a contract between
the United States and a country that provides financial assistance to
'95
help improve a low score on one of MCC's 17 policy indicators.
Threshold Program Agreements go to countries whose plans

90.
MCC Compacts, supra note 6.
91.
For instance, USAID has historically used a top-down approach whereby
USAID staff develop country-specific strategies, interventions, and programs to be
implemented in recipient countries. Steve Radelet, Will the Millennium Challenge
Account Be Different, WASH. Q., Spring 2003, at 171, 181-82. This approach has been
criticized as lacking recipient-country ownership in successful outcomes, requiring
minimal coordination with a country's overall development strategy, and placing
excessive staffing and resource demands on USAID. Id.
For evidence of the MCC's methodology, see Millennium Challenge Corporation,
About MCC, http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2009)
(describing "high-level engagement and leadership" required by governments of
countries which receive MCC aid); Jessica Davidson & Cate Johnston, Bush's
Millennium Challenge Corporation:A New Approach to Overseas Development, or the
Same Old Strategy?, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF., Aug.
16, 2005,
http://www.coha.org/2005/08/bushs- millennium-challenge-corporation-a-new-approachto-overseas-development-or-the-same-old-strategy/ ("Taking each country's individual
priorities and unique needs into consideration and allowing governments to develop
their own proposals represents a marked departure from the typical U.S. approach to
international aid after World War II.").
92.
Id. (follow "maintaining eligibility" hyperlink).
93.
Danilovich, supra note 23, at 30.
94.
Millennium Challenge Account, Program and Activities, Threshold
Program Agreements, http://www.mcc.gov/programs/threshold.php (last visited Feb.
13, 2009) [hereinafter MCC Threshold Program Agreements].
95.
Id.
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demonstrate a meaningful commitment to reform and a high
likelihood of successful implementation. 96
Per Congressional
mandate, ten percent of MCA funds may be allocated to Threshold
Programs. 97 The MCC Board selects countries based on: (1) overall
performance
on all 17 policy indicators;
(2) demonstrated
commitment to improving scores on failing indicators; and (3) ability
to undertake reform. 98 Once selected to receive Threshold assistance,
countries must create their own plan that identifies measurable ways
to improve a specific indicator score and then submit that plan to the
MCC for review and approval. Over twenty countries had received
Threshold assistance through FY2007. 99
As discussed in Part
TV.A.2., many of these Threshold recipients have made notable
improvements in indicator scores, making them eligible for MCA
Compact funding.
B. Analyzing the MCA Concept Through a PartisanFramework
1.

Indicators and Aid Selectivity

The range and hierarchy of the three MCA pillars provides
substantial insight into the political process behind the Millennium
Challenge Act. Although myriad factors influenced the decision to
ultimately use good governance, economic freedom, and investing in
people as the three pillars of MCA eligibility, political motivations
provide a straightforward framework for analyzing their influence on
the MCA model. 100 The eligibility indicators have been relatively
fluid in the last several years as the MCA seeks to strike a balance
between conservative free-market ideals, evidenced in the Economic
Freedom indices, and more liberal social-development ideals,
evidenced in the Investing in People indices. 1 1 However, the "good
governance" indicators remain the most fundamental, as they include
the only two mandatory hurdles for eligibility. 10 2 This is proof of both

96.
Id. (follow "selection methodology" hyperlink).
97.
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. § 7715(d) (2006).
98.
Millennium Challenge Account, Selection Step 2: Publish Country Selection
Criteria & Methodology, http://www.mcc.gov/selection/step02-publish.php (last visited
Feb. 13, 2009)
99.
Id.
100.
Millennium Challenge Account, Selection Indicators, supra note 26.
101.
CURT TARNOFF, CONG. RES. SERV., FOREIGN AFF., DEF., & TRADE DIv.,
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT, AT CRS-2 (2007). As can be seen by Tarnoff s
review of Congressional Appropriations Sessions and subsequent changes in MCA
Indicators, congressional feedback has been a driving force behind many of the
modifications to MCA eligibility criteria.
102.
See discussion infra Part III.B.l.c. All MCA Compact recipients must
satisfy the MCC's "Control of Corruption" requirement, FY2009 MCC INDICATORS,
supra note 72, at 3; furthermore, democracy has seemingly become a de facto hurdle
based on an analysis of MCA country selections, WIL HOUT, THE POLITICS OF AID
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the importance of the good governance indicators and their ability to
transcend political biases.
a.

Economic Freedom
The Economic Freedom indicators
measure the extent to which a government encourages economic
freedom by assessing, inter alia, demonstrated commitment to economic
policies that encourage individuals and firms to participate in global
trade and international capital markets, promotion of private sector
growth and the sustainable management of natural resources, strength
103
of market forces in the economy, and respect for worker rights.

The six Economic Freedom indicators are: Regulatory Quality, Fiscal
Policy, Trade Policy, Business Start Up, Inflation, and Land Rights
and Access.' 0 4 Using a partisan framework, this pillar can most
accurately be categorized as advancing a conservative, free marketoriented Republican agenda. Indeed, the Bush Administration and
key Republican congressmen touted the development of free markets
and international trade as a primary goal of the MCA and heavily
influenced the Economic Freedom criterion. 10 5
Regardless of partisan interest, there is strong justification for
the inclusion of the Economic Freedom indicators. Economic freedom
and open markets have been foundational in recent successful
developing countries.' 0 6 The governments of emerging development
powerhouses such as South Africa, India, and China have all
substantially liberalized their markets. 0 7 There is also empirical
support for the link between economic freedom and good
governance.' 0 8 For instance, no democracy has ever failed in a
country where the GDP per capita is over $6,050.109 Economic
freedom and governance have evinced a direct correlation in the MCA
eligibility indicators as well, as reported in the 2005 Harvard Report:

SELECTIVITY: GOOD GOVERNANCE CRITERIA IN WORLD BANK, US AND DUTCH
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 95-96 (2007).
103.
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNThttp://www.mcc.gov/selectionindicators/indicators6,
DESCRIPTIONS
INDICATOR
extendeddescriptions.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter MCA INDICATOR
DESCRIPTIONS].
Id.
104.
105.
Bush, supra note 42 ("The advances of free markets and trade and
democracy and rule of law have brought prosperity to an ever-widening circle of people
in this world."); John B. Taylor, Under Sec'y for Int'l Aff., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Speech before Cato Institute, Washington, DC, Economic Freedom and the Millennium
Challenge Account (July 15, 2004), available at http://www.treas.govlpressl
releases/js1787.htm.
Taylor, supra note 105.
106.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
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[The Report] shows the link between economic freedom and good
governance.... Countries in the top 20 percent in terms of economic
freedom scored nearly eight out of ten on average in the Transparency
International corruption perception index, where ten is the best score a
country can receive. Those in the bottom 20 percent scored only 2.5 out
1 10
of ten.

Of course, there is the notable issue of causality with this statisticwhether lack of corruption breeds economic success or whether more
economically advanced societies are better at reducing corruption.
Nonetheless, it does draw a strong connection between good
governance and economic freedom and strengthens the case for
measuring economic freedom in determining MCA funding eligibility.
b.

Investing in People

The Investing in People pillar is probably the most contentious
category. Investing in People aims to measure "investments in
people, particularly women and children, by assessing programs that
promote broad-based primary education, strengthen and build
capacity to provide quality public health, and reduce child
mortality."111 This category speaks to the very heart of development
and poverty alleviation and addresses the most basic needs of society
such as health and education. However, this category has also been
the most politically polarizing of the three categories. 112 Democrats
in Congress have consistently challenged the MCC to address these
issues more effectively and to expand the base of social investments
considered in the eligibility indicators. 113 The MCA currently uses
only five Investing in People indicators, some of which have
significant overlap: total public expenditure on health; immunization
rates; total public expenditure on primary education; girl's primary
1 14
education completion rate; and natural resource management.
Legislative history during the creation of the MCA and
subsequent House and Senate Committee reports demonstrate the
desire of Democratic Congressmen to see a greater focus on the
Investing in People indicators. 115 Key congressional figures have

110. Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 22.
MCA INDICATOR DESCRIPTIONS, supranote 103, at 11.
111.
112. TARNOFF, supra note 101, at 4.
113. Id.
114. FY2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 3.
115. See TARNOFF, supra note 101, at CRS-4-CRS-5. The MCC is required to
send proposed eligibility indictors to Congress for review annually. While the proposed
MCC criteria is generally approved, lawmakers have included some significant
additional factors upon which the MCC must evaluate a country's performance. These
factors almost always relate to "Investing in People." Examples of additional
congressional factors are a demonstrated track record in:
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voiced concerns regarding the lack of indicators addressing
environmental sustainability, women's rights, worker's rights, and
the rights of people with disabilities. 116 The MCC has addressed
these concerns in part by creating a "Natural Resource Management"
indicator, used as supplemental information for FY2007 eligibility
determinations and introduced as a full indicator beginning
FY2008.1 17 This indicator measures a government's commitment to
"sound management of water resources and water systems, proper
sewage disposal and sanitary control, air quality standards, habitat
' 18
preservation, and biodiversity protection."
Any social development indicators must be determined with
caution as there is increased danger of mistaking causal
relationships. Many of the social objectives argued for under the
Investing in People category will hopefully improve as a result of
development aid invested through the MCA into stable governments
and economies, but might be difficult to enact ex ante with limited
resources and institutional support from donor organizations such as
the MCC. Furthermore, social indicators may be greatly influenced
by factors outside the government's immediate control, making it
difficult to adequately measure the direct impact of policy and
regulation in affecting change. For instance, the girl's primary
education completion rate indicator is influenced by numerous social
factors such as family resources, teenage pregnancy, societal stigma,
and lack of respect within the family and the community for the
rights of the girl child. Therefore, substantial reliance on this
indicator risks undermining the principle mission of the MCA-longterm and sustainable growth-which will then create increased
internal capacity to address social crises and invest in the overall
wellbeing of all citizens.

" recognizing

the rights of people with disabilities;

" respecting worker rights;
" supporting a sustainable management of natural resources; and
* making social investments, especially in women and girls.
Id. at CRS-5.
116. Id. at CRS-4-CRS-5.
AND

117.
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS
THE SELECTION PROCESS: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 25 (2008), available at

http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-fy8-guidetoindicatorsandtheselectionprocess.pdf
[hereinafter FY2008 MCA INDICATORS]. The Natural Resource Management indicator
was used as supplemental information in FY2007, but did not immediately become a
mandatory indicator in order to allow countries time to assess their performance and
ways to improve 'natural resource management' scores. Id. Natural Resource
Management was finally established as a full-fledged indicator in FY2008 and will
continue to be used in FY2009. Millennium Challenge Corp., Natural Resource
Management
Indicator
Search, http://www.mcc.gov/selectionindicators/natural
resourcessearch.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
118.

FY2008 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 117, at 25.
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Notwithstanding the call for caution, Investing in People
remains a key pillar of the MCA concept. Countries demonstrating a
commitment to improving citizen welfare are more likely to use aid
money to further those goals. Socially responsible laws and policies,
well-functioning social welfare structures, and committed leadership
set the foundation for successful aid investment. The Investing in
People pillar also helps to link the MCA to the Millennium
Development
Goals, which
are primarily concerned with
improvements in social welfare." 9 Because the MCA is meant to be
the U.S. vehicle for contributing to the achievement of the MDGs, it is
important that the two initiatives provide a coherent and cohesive
system of indicators, inputs, and results.
c.

Ruling Justly

The third and arguably most important pillar is Ruling Justly,
which addresses good governance and the rule of law. 120 Ruling
Justly, as defined by the MCA, measures "just and democratic
governance by assessing, inter alia, a country's demonstrated
commitment to promote political pluralism, equality, and the rule of
law; respect human and civil rights, including the rights of people
with disabilities; protect private property rights; encourage
transparency and accountability of government; and combat
corruption. '121 The six indicators in the Ruling Justly category are:
civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government
12 2
effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption.
Given the great possibility for partisan politics to play into the
indicators, there is a strong case to be made for making good
governance a higher priority than either social or economic indicators.
In fact, numerous MCA experts such as Lael Brainard, Steven
Radelet, and Wil Hout have all suggested placing greater emphasis
on governance indicators. 123 The MCA has already done this to some
extent. 124 By making control of corruption the only mandatory
hurdle, the MCA has created a minimum standard of transparency
and accountability in government, regardless of the political

119.
120.

See supraPart II.A.
MCA INDICATOR DESCRIPTIONS,supra note 103, at 1.

121.

Id.

122.
Id.
123.
U.S. Foreign Assistance: Reinventing Aid for the 21st Century: Hearing
before the H. Comm. on State, Foreign Operations, & Related Programs, 110th Cong.
(2008) (statement of Lael Brainard, Vice President and Director, Global Economy &
Development), available at http://www.brookings.edultestimony/2008/0123_foreign_
assistancereformbrainard.aspx [hereinafter Brainard Testimony-Reinventing Aid];
HOUT, supra note 102, at 19; RADELET, supra note 68, at 2.
124.
See HOUT, supra note 102, at 117-18 (describing the six governance
indicators relied on by the MCA).
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environment. 125
However, as evidenced by Georgia's inclusion
despite a comparatively low score on controlling corruption, this is
126
not an absolute bar to eligibility.
The MCC has also seemingly made democracy a de facto
hurdle. 127 Three of the Ruling Justly indicators-political rights, civil
liberties,
and voice
and accountability-implicitly
measure
democracy. 128 In 2004, the MCC excluded Bhutan, Mauritania, and
Vietnam from eligibility despite them scoring above the median on
more than half of the indicators. 129 Although Bhutan, Vietnam, and
Mauritania technically "passed the test" for MCA eligibility, they
scored below the median on the three democracy indicators and are
"not considered by the international community to be democracies.' 130
The MCA Monitor, an arm of the Centre for Global Development, has
suggested that the MCC is setting a precedent that non-democracies
will generally not be selected for MCA eligibility. 13 1 "In effect, the
Board implicitly has made democracy a 'hard hurdle' for MCA
eligibility.' 32
Many commentators have recommended making
democracy an explicit mandatory requirement in order to increase
transparency and remove from Board discretion the determination of
whether a country is "sufficiently democratic."'1 33 However, the MCC
134
to date has not taken this approach.

125.
See id. at 129 ("[Tlhe significant and negative coefficients of control of
corruption . . . bear witness to the programme's focus on corruption, as selected
countries tend to score low on the corruption variable.").
126.
Fact Sheet, Millennium Challenge Corp., Georgia: Compact-Eligible
Country Report (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/csrgeorgia.pdf.
127.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 95-96; see also Sarah Lucas & Steve Radelet, An
MCA Scorecard: Who Qualified, Who Did Not, and the MCC Board's Use of Discretion
pt. 3 (Ctr. for Global Dev., May 2004), available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/
commentary/MCAScorecard_0528.pdf (describing how "the Board has implicitly made
democracy a 'hard hurdle' for MCA eligibility").
128.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 96.
129.
Lucas & Radelet, supra note 127, pt. 3; Millennium Challenge Corporation,
2004 Country Scorecards, http://www.mcc.gov/selection/scorecards/2004/index.php
(follow Bhutan, Mauritania, and Vietnam "country scorecard" hyperlinks) (last visited
Feb. 13, 2009).
130.
Lucas & Radelet, supra note 127, pt. 3.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 96; see, e.g., Stephen Radelet & Sheila Herrling,
The MCC Between a Rock and a Hard Place: More Countries, Less Money and the
Transformational Challenge 5 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Oct. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/14132/.
One clear option would be to introduce a hard democracy hurdle similar to the
current one for control of corruption. It is perfectly reasonable for an American
aid program intended to support a select number of countries to target that aid
to democracies. In past years, a number of non-democracies and questionable
democracies that passed the indicators were not selected by the MCC Board.
The formal response provided was that the Board invoked the "substantially
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Regardless of whether democracy is a mandatory requirement,
the control of corruption requirement demonstrates that good
governance is central to MCA eligibility. It is also central to the MCA
concept that aid is more effective in countries with a demonstrated
track record of transparency and control of corruption.' 3 5 This pillar
is also vital to the continued success of the MCA because it introduces
a nonpartisan element into the MCA selection process and the MCA
concept in general.

2.

The Partisanship of Compact Selection

Compact selection can also be analyzed by means of a partisan
framework. 'A statement in the MCA charter advancing "marketdriven economic growth" implicitly sets the stage for most Compact
proposals. 136 The MCA has taken an increasingly free market and
pro-business approach to Compact funding.' 3 7 Recent Compacts have
focused on funding such activities as "remov[ing] barriers to foreign
and local private sector investments" in Lesotho, "increas[ing]
economic activity . . . including exports, by improving the country's
rail network" in Mongolia, and "rehabilitat[ing] electric power
distribution systems [and] add[ing] new generation and transmission
capacity" in Tanzania. 13 8 Recently, the MCC announced its intent to
more closely collaborate with the private sector in MCA Compact
growth
countries
in
order
to
further
expand
economic
opportunities.' 3 9
The headline of the MCA press release is

below" exception for cases where a country performs substantially below the
median on at least one indicator. When used this way, as time goes on,
"substantially below" looks increasing like a politically-correct way out instead
of a transparent pass or fail test. Introducing a hard democracy hurdlescoring above the median on the voice and accountability indicator, for
example-would reduce a lot of the exceptions made and would publicly
recognize that the Board is putting more weight on being a democracy.

Id.
134.
See FY2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 3 (demonstrating that
control of corruption remains the only mandatory hurdle). Other factors measuring
democracy are technically still categorized along with the other 14 indicators, and
countries must only score above the median on half of these. Id.
135.
See generally Bush, supra note 42 (noting that the Millennium Challenge
Account will reward nations that root out corruption, respect human rights, and adhere
to the rule of law).
136. All-Gov, Millennium Challenge Corporation, http://www.allgov.comlAgency/
MillenniumChallengeCorporation (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
137.
Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corp., MCC Compacts Totaling $2.55
Billion Enter Into Force in September (Sept. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.mcc.gov/press/releases/documents/release-092308-billions.php.
138.
Id.
139.
Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corp., Millennium Challenge
Corporation Holds Private Sector Dialogue Sessions to Explore Collaborative Trade
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informative in gauging the MCA's increasing trend towards opening
markets to trade, "Millennium Challenge Corporation Holds Private
Sector Dialogue Sessions to Explore Collaborative Trade and
140
Investment Opportunities."'
The MCA has funded some social or welfare oriented programs,
such as access to healthcare. 14 1 However, as evidenced by the
Madagascar Compact, these elements are not MCA priorities. 14 2 As
one MCA critic explains in frustration,
Madagascar asked for aid for hospitals and schools-but none of the
money in its compact is allotted for either health or education. Instead,
roughly a third of the aid will be used to improve credit standards and
assist financial institutions, including $21 million to help banks in
14 3
Madagascar clear checks.

This highly partisan bias in funding allocations detracts from the
original mission and potential success of the MCA. It is hoped that a
stronger Democrat presence in Washington, D.C., will balance this
increasing trend towards pure market-oriented Compacts.
IV. SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND THE NEED FOR REFORM

Although founded in empirically-sound research and common
sense, the Millennium Challenge Account is a revolutionary initiative
whose success was far from guaranteed. Now in its fourth year of
existence, the MCA has achieved tangible results, proven both
anecdotally and empirically.14 4 It has been responsible for regulatory
reforms ex ante through the MCA Effect and has generated results ex
post through the MCA Compacts. The MCA is also revolutionizing
less stable governments through judicial and legal reform in its
Threshold programs. 14 5 However, despite these successes, partisan
interests continue to undermine the impartiality and development
mission of the MCA. This is evidenced both by distinctly partisan
criterion in the eligibility indicators, questionable uses of discretion

and Investment Opportunities (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.mcc.gov/
press/releases/documents/release-060908-psidialogues.php.
140.
Id.
141.
For example, Compacts in Cape Verde, El Salvador, and Ghana as well as
Threshold programs in Indonesia, Moldova, and Kenya have some health-related
component. Millennium Challenge Corp., MCC Recognizes World Health Day,
http://www.mcc.gov/features/worldhealth/index.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). The
Threshold programs in Kenya and Moldova are particularly interesting because they
combine health and governance by combating corruption in the healthcare sector. Id.
142.
See Fact Sheet, Millennium Challenge Corp., Madagascar Compact
Progress (Jan.-Mar. 2009), available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/qsr-impmadagascar.pdf (focusing on economic development).
143.
Id.
144.
See supraPart I.
145.
See supraPart III.A.2.
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by the MCA Board of Directors, and a program focus skewed
146
disproportionately towards industry and agricultural development.
The danger of partisanship cannot be overstated.
The MCA's
disproportionate focus on economic development has labeled it as a
purely Republican initiative. 14 7 It faces serious pressure from a
Democrat majority in Congress to modify its core model and focus
instead of short-term humanitarian assistance and politically
motivated aid. 148 In order to resist this, the MCA must refocus on
governance and the rule of law and then champion the benefits of its
approach to a bipartisan constituency in Congress and the foreign aid
community.
A. Empiricaland Anecdotal Successes Achieved by the MCA
1.

The MCA Effect

The MCA has impacted the rule of law and principles of good
governance in developing countries through the "MCA Effect." 149 The
MCA Effect refers to fundamental reforms undertaken by developing
countries in order to be eligible for MCA funding. 150 This was an
original goal of the MCA, as explained by President Bush in 2002.
"The goal is to provide people in developing nations the tools they
need to seize the opportunities of the global economy. In return-in
return for this additional commitment, we expect nations to adopt the
reforms and policies that make development effective and lasting."'15 1
Bush stressed that the MCA was designed to "reward nations that
root out corruption, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of
law."'1 52 In fact, some scholars have argued that MCA Compacts
could actually be "less important than the policy changes countries
undertake to qualify for MCA assistance.' 5 3
Anecdotal evidence by MCA-eligible countries further supports
the MCA Effect and suggests that countries are modifying their
behavior and regulatory environment in hopes of gaining access to

146.
See supra Part III.B.
147.
See supra Part I.
148.
See id. (discussing the future of the MCA in a newly-Democratic
Washington).
149.
See Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 22, at 2 (describing attempts to estimate
how much the incentive for funding is actually improving conditions in developing
nations and referring to such impact as the "MCC effect").
150.
Id.
151.
Bush, supra note 42.
152.
Id.
153.
Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 22, at 5 (quoting FREDERIC SAUTET ET AL.,
THE CHALLENGE AHEAD: MAINTAINING A Focus ON INCENTIVES TO ENABLE
DEVELOPMENT 6 (2005), available at http://www.mca.gov/selection/reportsfMercatus_
CenterCommentFY06.PDF) (emphasis added).
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MCA funds. 154 For instance, Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan
Oksanian used MCA funding to plead with his countrymen for
increased openness in the upcoming election stating, "We are now in
a situation where any step away from democratization and a repeat of
electoral fraud would have an economic cost. And I can name that
cost: 235 million dollars."'15 5 The Minister of Finance in Bangladesh
recently pointed to his country's exclusion from MCA eligibility as one
156
of the most serious consequences for its high level of corruption.
One of the most surprisingly conspicuous and positive outcomes
of the MCA Effect has been an improvement in the business
regulatory environment of many countries. 157 Representatives of
MCA candidate countries have pointed to MCA funds as the principle
rationale behind these reforms. 158 According to a World Bank Doing
Business report (a source of two MCA indicators), twenty-four
countries enacting reforms making it easier to start a new business
159
claim to have done so in order to potentially receive MCA funds.
Of course, a recent Harvard study suggests that many non-candidate
countries have also enacted business regulatory reforms,
60
undermining to some extent the MCA's exclusive impact.'
Nonetheless, it appears from testimonial evidence that country
officials perceive the possibility of receiving MCA funds as a sufficient
incentive for undertaking fairly tangible reforms. 161 Furthermore, it

154.
Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Millennium Challenge
Account: Already Paying Dividends (Apr. 2005), availableat http://www.mcc.gov/pressl
factsheets/2005/factsheet-040005-mcadividends.php
[hereinafter
MCA
Paying
Dividends].
See generally Millennium
Challenge
Corp.,
Success
Stories,
http://www.mcc.gov/press/successstories/index.php
(last visited Feb. 13, 2009)
[hereinafter Success Stories] (highlighting Millennium Challenge Corporation success
in countries around the world).
155.
Oskanian Warns of 'Economic Cost' of Vote Rigging, Armtown.com, Dec. 29,
2005, http://www.armtown.com/news/en/rfe/20051229/200512293/.
The MCC has
granted funds to Armenia conditional on corrective steps that would improve the
government's human rights record and rule out voting irregularities in the future. Id.
156.
MCA Paying Dividends, supra note 154.
157.
Doing Business, Reforms in Africa, 2006-07, http://www.doingbusiness.org/
Reformers/Africa2007.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Reforms in Africa].
158.
Id.
159.
John Danilovich, Remarks at Third Anniversary Forum Hosted by the
Society
for
International
Development
(Jan
17,
2007),
available at
http://www.bread.org/learn/global-hunger-issues/millennium-challenge-account/MCC.pdf.
Benin, Burundi, and Guinea Bissau reduced the cost of registering property by
reducing the registration or transfer tax. Reforms in Africa, supra note 157. These
measures were in part motivated by the desire of these countries to pass the
Millennium Challenge Corporation eligibility threshold. Id. The World Bank's Doing
Business Blog recently made an impassioned plea for continued funding of the MCA,
citing its important work in tying aid to quantifiable metrics. Posting of Simeon
Djankov to Doing Business Blog, http:/Iblog.doingbusiness.org/2007/12/viva-lamillenn.html (Dec. 9, 2007).
160. Johnson & Zajonc, supranote 22, at 9.
161.
Id.

20091

GOVERNANCE REFORM THROUGH PERFORMANCE-BASEDAID 651

appears that these regulatory reforms are having a direct impact on
the business environment as evidenced by a key outcome indicator:
163
162
Madagascar is an excellent example.
days to start a business.
Since signing a Compact with the MCC in 2005, Madagascar has
decreased the time necessary to start a business from sixty-seven
days to one week and cut the minimum capital requirement by eighty
164
percent, leading to a 26% increase in new business start-ups.
In perhaps the most significant MCA-initiated policy change, the
government of Lesotho, a small country in Southern Africa, enacted
the "Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act" in direct response to
MCA funding negotiations.1 65
This Act abolishes a husband's
exclusive marital power and grants women independent access to
credit. 166 Prior to enactment of the Act, married women had the
same legal status as minors and were prohibited from entering
contracts or owning property. 167
Married women also had no
168
standing in civil court.
Although Lesotho was technically eligible
for Compact funding, the MCC strongly encouraged rapid action to
correct this serious legal inequality.' 69 The MCA built upon this
MCA Effect by assisting with implementation of the new law through
Lesotho's MCA Compact. 170 These and other stories suggest a direct
correlation between governance and regulatory reforms and the
incentive of receiving MCA Compact funds. It appears that social and
legal reforms, such as Lesotho's law reform efforts, may be less robust
and systematic than economic regulatory reforms.' 71 However, they
do point to the incredible potential of the MCA to inspire positive
legal reform.
In addition to the anecdotal evidence provided by developing
country reports and the MCC, a recent Harvard study provides
limited empirical evidence of the MCA's positive results. 72 The

162.
Danilovich, supra note 159.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
S. Res. 103, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110_cong_bills&docidr-f:sr 103ats.txt.pdf
("Commending the Kingdom of Lesotho, on the occasion of International Women's Day,
for the enactment of a law to improve the status of married women and ensure the
access of married women to property rights.").
166.
Buhle Angelo Dube, The Law and Legal Research in Lesotho: Protection of
Women's Rights, GLOBALEX (Feb. 2008), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/
Lesotho.htm#.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
See id. (indicating the targeted and circumscribed nature of Lesotho's legal
reforms).
172.
See generally Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 22 (concluding that countries
seem to respond to Millennium Challenge Corporation incentives by improving
governance).
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report, Can Foreign Aid Create Good Governance? Evidence from the
Millennium Challenge Corporation,assessed the validity of the MCA
Effect and questioned whether developing countries were improving
their performance indicators in hopes of receiving MCA funds. 173 The
Harvard study concluded that countries were indeed improving
indicators in order to become eligible for MCA Compacts:
Even though the MCC is still in its infancy, we find substantial
evidence that countries improve their indicators because of the MCC.
Candidate countries-countries that are potential recipients of MCC
funds-are more likely to improve their performance on the indicators
used by the MCC and display greater absolute increases on these
1 74

indicators.

The research used two primary methods of comparison to assess
the performance of MCA candidate countries: (1) improvement on key
indicators vis-A-vis non-candidate countries; 175 and (2) post-MCA
performance on key indicators versus performance before the MCA
was introduced. 176 In order to assess post-MCA performance, the
study tracked results between 2002 (immediately following the
introduction of the MCA) and 2004.177 The empirical results were
relatively consistent and generally positive in both of these
assessments.178
The study first found that candidate countries were improving
179
more than non-candidate countries on a vast majority of indicators.
On eleven of fourteen indicators, candidate countries had a better
mean rate of improvement than poor non-candidate countries after
the introduction of the MCA. 80° "On five indicators-political rights,
civil liberties, health expenditure, education expenditure and
immunization rates-candidate countries are at least twice as likely
as non-candidate countries to improve their performance.' 1 In the
three indicators where candidate country performance was worse
than comparable non-candidate country performance-voice and
accountability, government effectiveness, and control of corruptionthe differences were only a few percentage points. 182 "Compared to

Id. at 1.
173.
Id. at 2.
174.
Id. at 14. Insufficient data was available for comparison in two indicators:
175.
girl's primary education and business start cost. Id.
Id. Insufficient data was available for three of the eligibility indicators. Id.
176.
at 20-21.
177.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
178.
179.
Id. at 14-15.
Id.
180.
181.
Id. at 15.
182.
Id.
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the substantial positive differences these negative results are
183
small."
The study also found that candidate countries performed better
after the introduction of the MCA than before, even when controlling
for general time trends by using reform patterns of non-candidate
countries.18 4 On nine of thirteen indicators, candidate countries were
more likely to improve performance after the formation of the MCA
than they had before the MCA concept was introduced.' 8 5 On five
indicators-civil liberties, education expenditure, health expenditure,
immunization rates, and regulatory quality-candidate countries
were 25% more likely to reform after the MCA. 8 6 "In other words, on
these five indicators candidate countries are more than 25 percentage
points more likely to reform after the MCC was created than before it,
even after subtracting the difference in reform between these two
time periods experienced by poor non-candidate countries. '18 7 Again,
the four indicators with negative trends-voice and accountability,
government effectiveness, control of corruption and trade policyshowed relatively small negative correlations as compared to the
positive trends of the other indicators.' 8 8
Any empirical research in developing countries is subject to
disproportionately high margins of error due to lack of data
availability and inconsistent collection.' 8 9 Nonetheless, the Harvard
study presents a compelling case for the MCA Effect. This study is
vitally important to the MCA for several reasons. Most obviously, it
provides underlying empirical evidence both for the concept of
performance-based aid and for the Millennium Challenge Account
itself.190 Although very preliminary, these positive trends grant
credence to the idea that developing countries respond well to a
performance-based aid strategy.
The negative trends in the empirical evidence are equally
important. In both comparisons (using time trends and comparing
non-candidate country performance), MCA candidate countries
showed slightly negative trends on three of the six governance
indicators: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and
control of corruption. 191 Johnson and Zajonc argue that these trends
are not statistically significant vis-A-vis the substantially positive

183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.

186.

Id. tbl.6.

187.
Id. at 17.
188.
Id. tbl.6.
189.
Id. at 10; see Kaufmann & Kraay, supra note 4, pt. III.1 (discussing
margins of error in governance indicators and ways to overcome them).
190.
See generally Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 22 (analyzing the MCA Effect).
191.
Trade Policy is the fourth indicator showing a slightly negative trend after
the introduction of the MCA. Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 22, tbl.6.
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trends in other indictors. 19 2 However, these results do lead to the
conclusion that the MCA Effect is not as robust in improving
governance indicators as economic and social investment indicators.
There are several possible explanations for this result. Some critics
argue that certain indicators such as the business regulatory
environment are subject to manipulation. 193 However, the Johnson
Report found "most of the indicators to be sufficiently robust to the
threat of manipulation to conclude that the majority of the majority of
improvements observed are due to changes in actual policies.'' 194 A
less cynical and arguably more likely explanation for the lower
governance scores is that it is more difficult to enact policy changes
sufficient to rapidly improve governance scores in the course of a few
years. Given the importance of good governance to the MCA concept,
this lack of measurable improvement presents a potential weakness
of the current MCA system and suggests a need to focus more
proactively on governance both in the eligibility process and in actual
MCA Compacts.
2.

MCA Compacts and Funding Allocations

a.

MCA Compacts

The MCA has also achieved early successes in Compact
programs. As of December 2007, the MCC had committed over $5.5
billion through Compacts with sixteen developing countries designed
"to reduce poverty through economic growth," 195 and these Compacts
are beginning to deliver measurable results. The following examples
196
were taken from the MCA website:
*

Madagascar-Agricultural
Business
Centers
are
operational in five zones and nearly one million documents
have been inventoried to enable better land use.

*

Armenia-thousands of farmers, almost 23 percent of which
are women, have been trained in on-farm water
management, designed to ultimately increase agricultural
production.

*

Georgia-one portion of the Compact has been used to make
emergency repairs to the North-South Gas Pipeline,

192.
Id. at 2.
193.
Id. at 20.
194.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
195.
Fact Sheet, Millennium Challenge Corp., Millennium Challenge
Corporation Makes Headway: Achieving Results in the Fight Against Poverty (Dec. 7,
2007), available at
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/factsheet-120707-resultsmake
headway.pdf [hereinafter MCC Makes Headway].
196.
Id.

20091 GOVERNANCE REFORM THROUGH PERFORMANCE-BASED AID 655

"improving the long term security of the country's natural
gas supply and providing Georgian citizens with electricity

and heating as temperatures drop. ' 197 Additional funds are
being used as grants to new or expanding agribusinesses,
helping them improve technologies and access markets.
"

Nicaragua-land

titles

have

been

and

continue

to be

distributed to thousands of beneficiaries.
*

Burkina Faso--132 schools

and 396 teachers residences

have been built.

As demonstrated by the above examples, MCA Compacts are
evincing an increasingly homogenous trend towards agriculture and
industrial expansion and have shown little progress in tackling more

complicated governance

reform initiatives. 198

Administration highlighted its macro-economic

Indeed, the Bush
focus in

an initial

policy paper outlining the function of the MCA. 199 "In 2008, MCC
will see an unprecedented level of implementation activity related to
these major infrastructure projects.

b.

' 20 0

Threshold Agreements

Given the underwhelming results in the MCA Effect's ability to
improve governance indicators, there has been surprisingly little
focus on governance in MCA Compacts. 20 1
However, governance

197.
Id.
198.
See id. (focusing almost exclusively on economic development programs to
the general exclusion of political reforms).
199.
U.S. Government Background Paper, Implementing the Millennium
Challenge Act 1(Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.mcc.gov/about/reports/other/
mcc-background paper.pdf.
The goal of the MCA is to reduce poverty by significantly increasing the
economic growth trajectory of recipient countries. This requires an emphasis on
investments that raise the productive potential of a country's citizens and firms
and help integrate its economy into the global product and capital markets.
Key areas of focus would include:
*

Agricultural development

*

Education

*

Enterprise and private sector development

*

Governance

*

Health

*

Trade and investment capacity building

Id.
200.
MCC Makes Headway, supranote 195.
201.
See id. (indicating mostly industrial and agricultural focus of MCA
Compacts). See generally DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., GOVERNANCE MATTERS IV:
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR 1996-2004 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of measuring
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reforms and the rule of law play an instrumental and highly
successful role in Threshold Agreements to countries just barely
missing eligibility. The Millennium Challenge Act allows ten percent
The
of MCC funds to be allocated to Threshold programs.20 2
have
made
that
countries
Threshold program is designed to support
substantial progress in achieving MCA goals but still fall short of
meeting the minimum eligibility requirements for an MCA
Compact. 20 3 Two of the biggest stumbling blocks for these Threshold
countries have been the country corruption and rule of law indicators
in the "Governing Justly" category. 20 4 Control of corruption is the
only mandatory hurdle that must be overcome and many countries
are declared ineligible for aid based on their failure to score above the
median. 20 5 As previously discussed, democracy has become a de facto
mandatory hurdle as well. 20 6 Therefore, a strong incentive exists for
Threshold countries to undertake programs focusing on corruption
and other governance indicators measuring their commitment to
democratic ideals.
In 2006 and 2007, the MCA signed Threshold agreements
containing substantial governance reform provisions with Yemen, the
Kyrgyz Republic, and Tanzania. 20 7 Tanzania implemented a program
of professional training emphasizing government accountability as
part of its $11.15 million Threshold agreement. 20 8 This training and

change in governance and the effect of programs such as the MCA on governance
indicators).
202.
22 U.S.C.A. § 7715 (West 2009).
See MCC Threshold Program Agreements, supra note 94 (explaining that
203.
Threshold Program provides financial assistance to help countries improve a poor score
on a particular selection indicator).
See generally id. (showing Threshold countries using MCC funds to improve
204.
country corruption and rule of law indicators).
CHALLENGE
MILLENNIUM
CORP.,
CHALLENGE
See
MILLENNIUM
205.
CORPORATION 2008 COUNTRY SCOREBOOK 3 (2008), available at http://www.mcc.gov/
documents/mcc-2008-scorebook.pdf [hereinafter MCC 2008 COUNTRY SCOREBOOK].
Vietnam, Bhutan, and Mauritania, for example all technically scored high
206.
enough on at least half the indicators but were not declared eligible for funding. See id.
at 5, 20, 59, 88 (enumerating list of countries eligible for funding as well as the
individual scorecards of the three countries showing their performance on indicators).
See MCC Threshold Program Agreements, supra note 94; Millennium
207.
Challenge Corp., Tanzania Threshold Program, http://www.mcc.gov/countries/tanzania
threshold.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2009); Millennium Challenge Corp., Yemen
Threshold Program, http://www.mcc.gov/countries/yemen/index.php (last visited Feb.
13, 2009); Millennium Challenge Corp., Kyrgyz Republic Threshold Program,
http://www.mcc.gov/countries/kyrgyzrepublic/index.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
See Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program: Strategic Objective
208.
Grant Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Republic of
Tanzania to Combat Corruption art. 3, U.S.-Tanz., May 3, 2006, available at
(delineating means to
http://www.mcc.gov/countries/tanzania/Tanzania-SOAG.pdf
achieve goal of reducing corruption); Millennium Challenge Compact Between the
United States of America Acting Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation and
the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania Acting Through the Ministry of
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awareness program led to print media publishing "thousands of
stories exposing corruption in their country. '20 9 Tanzania's efforts in
exposing corruption and encouraging government accountability
achieved the anticipated results, and Tanzania signed a $698 million
Compact Agreement with the MCC in February 2008.210
In September 2007, the MCA approved a $20.6 million Threshold
program in Yemen, designed to address four Ruling Justly
indicators-control of corruption, rule of law, government
effectiveness, and political rights-as well as the fiscal policy
indicator under Economic Freedom. 2 11 Yemen is still engaged in
implementing the Threshold programs, with anticipated results to
212
include:
* Reduction in time needed to state a verdict in the commercial
courts from 6 months to 3 months;
* Reduction in customs clearance procedures from 8 days to 4
days.
* Twenty-five percent of government staff submitting financial
disclosure forms (currently none do);
* 2009 elections recognized as free and fair by Freedom House
In August 2007, the MCC signed a Threshold agreement with
the Kyrgyz Republic supporting efforts to fight corruption and
improve the rule of law. 2 13 This Threshold agreement provides
perhaps the best example of how the MCC can programmatically
influence governance reform. As the MCC announced on their
website, "MCC's Threshold Program will provide roughly $16 million
in assistance to help the Kyrgyz Republic address judicial, criminal
'214
justice and law enforcement reforms.

Finance, U.S.-Tanz., Feb 17, 2008, available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/
compact-tanzania.pdf [hereinafter Tanzania Compact] (resulting Compact).
209.
MCC Makes Headway, supranote 195, at 2.
210.
Tanzania Compact, supra note 208, art. 2.1.
211.
Memorandum from Frances C. McNaught, V.P. of Cong. & Pub. Aff.,
Millennium Challenge Corp., to Congress regarding Yemen Threshold Program 2 (Sept.
12, 2007), available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/cn-091207-yemen.pdf.
212.
Id. at 2, 4.
213.
See Fact Sheet, Millennium Challenge Corp., Millennium Challenge
Corporation Working with the Kyrgyz Republic To Fight Corruption and Promote Good
Governance (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/factsheet031408-kyrgyzrepublic.pdf [hereinafter Kyrgyz Fact Sheet] (describing the MCC's
Threshold Program with the Kyrgyz Republic); Memorandum from Matthew K.
McLean, V.P. of Cong. & Pub. Aff., Millennium Challenge Corp., to Congress regarding
Kyrgyz Republic
Threshold
Program
1 (Feb.
11, 2007),
available at
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/cn.021108-kyrgyz.pdf.
214.
Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corp., MCC Board Approves
Assistance To Support Governance Reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic (Aug. 9, 2007),
available at http://www.mcc.gov/press/releases/documents/release.080907-kyrgyzre
public.php.
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The judicial reform element is designed to decrease corruption in
the judiciary and strengthen the rule of law through ten distinct
proposed activities, including:
" Providing technical assistance to help implement new laws on
judicial selection and dismissal, including establishment of
the new National Council of Justice Affairs, which will
oversee these functions.
" Helping to establish a system to implement adequate and
transparent disciplinary procedures for judges through the
newly established Judicial Council.
" Providing technical assistance to improve implementation of
amended and improved commercial laws and increase the
enforcement of judgments.
* Enhancing system for publishing court decisions and
2 15
providing access to open court proceedings.
The criminal justice reform program is equally compelling.
"Under the MCC program, the Government of Kyrgyzstan will seek to
reduce public corruption in the criminal justice sector by
strengthening the legal framework, providing training for prosecutors
and judges, . . . and educating the public about anti-corruption
measures."2 16 A sample of the nine proposed activities include:
* Revising the criminal procedure code to reflect the greater
balance of powers between prosecutors and the judiciary.
* Evaluating the role of elder courts in handling minor crimes.
" Enhancing the prosecutor ethics code and its effective
implementation.
* Creating a civilian-oversight board for the police force.
" Developing, with the involvement of mass media, a public
awareness campaign on the detection, investigation, and
2 17
prosecution of corruption.
Although these judicial and criminal law reform programs may
not seem groundbreaking at first glance, they are revolutionary for
developing countries lacking transparent judiciaries or fair criminal
justice systems.21 8 For those countries whose citizens can have no
faith in the impartial and timely enforcement of their laws,
governance reform is truly a gift. During a March 2008 presentation
by the Iraqi Anfal War Crimes Tribunal, Judge Aref Abdul Razaq Al-

215.
Kyrgyz Fact Sheet, supra note 213, at 1-2.
216.
Id. at 3.
217.
Id. at 1, 3.
218.
See Open Society Justice Initiative, Central Asia and the Former Soviet
Union, http://www.justiceinitiative.org/regions/cafsu (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
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Shaheed stressed the importance of a functional judicial system:
"[T]he rule of law has to be seen as more powerful than the rule of
fear. If ...citizens have no confidence in the due process of law, they
will look for other ways to build their society and new
government. '219 This statement exemplifies the significance of a
strong rule of law and demonstrates why the MCA should shift its
focus in part to governance reforms.
Threshold program governance reforms have been a significant
220
success in furthering the rule of law and spurring legal reform.
These successes should inform future programs in both Threshold
and Compact countries. The benefits of MCA governance reforms in
Compact countries will be amplified to an even greater extent than in
Threshold countries. 22 1 Compact countries have already proven their
commitment to reform through being above the median in at least
half of the seventeen eligibility indicators, and they have stronger
institutional infrastructure in place to effectively implement
governance reform programs. 22 2 However, as noted by the Harvard
Report, Compact countries are not improving in governance
22 3
indicators to the same extent as in economic and social indicators.
This should be a call to action for the MCA in revising their Compact
programs to focus on governance reform. If the MCA truly is
committed to long term growth, a greater focus on creating legal and
policy frameworks capable of managing this growth is warranted.
Indeed, many Congress members share this sentiment and have
asked the MCC to take a more proactive approach in shaping certain
224
institutional reform elements of MCA Compacts.
B. Challenges Ahead: The Danger of Partisanship
The previous parts demonstrate the early anecdotal and
225
empirical success of the Millennium Challenge Account concept.
Much of this success comes from sound methodologies implemented
consistently and transparently. 22 6 This is evident in the eligibility

219.
Judge Aref Abdul Razaq Al-Shaheen, President of Iraqi Anfal Criminal
Tribunal, Speech at Vanderbilt University Law School (Jan. 31, 2008) (video available
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-LoUWCL8Uo6s) (speech begins at 7:40, quote
begins at 19:30).
220.
See supranotes 210-18 and accompanying text.
221.
See supra Part III.A.2 (noting that Compact-eligible countries have
demonstrated more positive signs of development and will be better equipped to handle
comprehensive governance reform programs).
222.
Id.
223.
Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 22, at 15.
224.
Kolbe, supra note 2.
225.
See supraPart IV.A-B.
226.
The MCA seeks to use "objective and quantifiable policy indicators" to
assess all eligibility categories and has utilized substantially the same indicators and
indicator sources since its inception. FY2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 4.
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indicators as well as in MCA Compacts and Threshold Programs. 227
The MCA also owes much of its success to maintaining a narrowly
defined mission and avoiding much of the political maneuvering
plaguing other aid programs. 228 Unfortunately, the MCA is currently
in danger of being influenced by politics in two key areas: (1) through
the use of eligibility indicators to promote partisan interests globally;
and (2) through the use of MCA funding for purposes of political
expediency. 229
Because certain elements of the MCA, such as
Investing in People and Economic Freedom indicators, are more
susceptible to partisanship, apolitical commonalities must be elevated
in importance to combat any overly liberal or overly conservative
leanings in the MCA. 230 This Part first discusses ways in which the
MCC is trending towards partisanship in eligibility indicators. This
Part will then critique the influence of partisan politics on MCA
funding allocations.
1.

Eligibility Indicators

The increasingly apparent partisanship in eligibility indicators
presents serious concerns as to the independence and soundness of
the MCA model. 231 Past statistics indicating that per capita GDP
actually decreased in a time of significant foreign aid expenditure
suggests that the historic physicians' mantra, FirstDo No Harm, may
also apply to foreign aid allocations. 232
Yet, partisan-focused
eligibility criteria risks doing significant harm in developing
countries. Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that countries
233
are changing laws and policies in order to qualify for MCA funding,
and established eligibility indicators significantly affect which laws
and policies countries focus on. 23 4 In a classic Pavlovian response,
the MCA's stated preference for economic growth has led countries to
focus on pro-business, free market reforms-perhaps at the expense
of important social and governance reforms.
Focusing on Economic Freedom indicators also undermines the
long-term success of the MCA model. Countries with advanced

These indicators have not changed significantly since the inception of the MCA in 2004.
Compare id. at 2-4, with MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., REPORT ON THE CRITERIA
AND METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT ASSISTANCE IN FY2004, at 1-3 (2004), available at
http://mca.gov/selection/reports/FYO4_CriteriaMethodology.pdf.
227.
See supraPart W.A.
228.
See supra Part II.D (noting that the partisanship and earmarking of
USAID created an opening for the MCA concept).
229.
See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1-B.2.
230.
Id.
231.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
232.
Kolbe, supra note 2.
233.
See supra Part W.A.
234.
Id.
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economic policies may look successful in the short term. However,
without rigorous institutional and legal frameworks, these apparently
successful countries risk falling into the trap of greed and corruption
that has befallen so many emerging markets in recent history.
Zimbabwe provides perhaps the most telling example of this danger.
Considered the "Jewel of Africa" until the late 1990s, Zimbabwe had
strong agriculture, manufacturing, and banking sectors as well as a
well-functioning justice system and strong legal framework. 235 Now,
Zimbabwe faces unemployment of over 90%, the world's highest
236
inflation rate, and shortages of food, fuel, and foreign currency.
More than two million people are in severe need of food aid and one in
four Zimbabwean children is malnourished. 237 Analyzing this rapid
freefall, academics point primarily to a breakdown in governance and
the rule of law. 238 Greed and corruption led to politically-motivated
property rights reform and land reallocation. 239 Economic growth
disappeared almost instantly; foreign direct investment fell to zero by
240
2001, just one year after President Mugabe began farm seizures.
Zimbabwe's story presents a chilling reminder that, in the absence of
sound governance and an established rule of law, economic prosperity
can be fleeting. The MCA's model advocates long-term sustainability
and freedom from the poverty trap. 24 1 Though economic freedom is a
vitally important component of this model, long-term success if far
from guaranteed without the rule of law.
2.

Partisanship in Funding Allocations

The MCA faces constant pressure to use aid allocations for
political purposes, a strategy that significantly detracts from its
original purpose and mission. Despite lessons from USAID, which
has been heavily criticized for using foreign aid for purposes of
political expediency, the MCA is in serious risk of following the same
path. 242 The MCA-originally touted as being outside the realm of
political influence-is increasingly selecting eligible countries and
approving Compact proposals for political purposes. 243 As previously
noted, foreign aid serves many purposes, including use as a reward

235.
Sue Pleming, U.S. Wants Evidence of Reform, NEWS24.COM, Oct. 17, 2008,
http://www.news24.comlNews24/Africa/Zimbabwe/O,,2-11-1662_241 1473,00.html.
236.
Id.
237.
Id.
238.
Craig Richardson, How the Loss of Property Rights Caused Zimbabwe's
Collapse (CATO Economic Development Bulletin No. 4, Nov. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=9294.
239.
Id.
240.
Id.
241.
See supra Part III.A.
242.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
243.
See supra Part IV.B.
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for political allies. 244 However, the stated purpose of the MCA is
"Ending Poverty through Growth" and any deviation from this
mission undermines the revolutionary development impact of the
245
MCA concept.
a.

Board Discretion

As previously outlined, MCC Board discretion remains necessary
given unreliable data in several key indicators. 246 However, this
discretion introduces an element of subjectivity capable of
exploitation by partisan interests and political expediency. The MCA
is unique in that its mandate specifically rejects distributing aid on
the basis of U.S. interests. 2 47 Indeed, it has been true to this calling
by largely denying MCA Compacts to politically expedient countries
in the Middle East in favor of countries in Africa, Latin America, and
Asia, showing a greater commitment to progress and development. 248
However, certain decisions point to the covert influence of politics on
Board discretion. The inclusion of Georgia in the list of Compacteligible countries in 2004 was widely questioned as demonstrating
political bias. 249 Georgia only passed two of the six Ruling Justly
indicators, two of four investing in People indicators, and three of six
Economic Freedom indicators. 2 50 It also scored below the median in
"control of corruption," the only mandatory indicator. 2 51 In fact,
Georgia ranked 124 out of 133 countries on the TI corruption index
and 33 of 37 MCA countries being considered. 252 Yet, Georgia was
ultimately selected for an MCA Compact.
The trouble with selecting Georgia and similar countries falling
so far short of minimum eligibility criteria is two-fold. First, this
presents a troubling example of the potential for the MCA to bow to
political interests. Supporters of the decision have argued that the
MCA Board wanted to support Georgia's political transition and new,

244.
See supra Part IID.
245.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, About MCC, supra note 91.
246.
See supra Part III.A. 1.
247.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 75 (citing Hearing Before the Committee on
Foreign Relations: Millennium Challenge Account: A New Way to Aid, 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Andrew Natsios, Administrator, USAID), available at
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/NatsiosTestimonyO3O3O4.pdf) (noting that the
MCA "fully rejected the notion of conditionality").
248.
See
generally
Millennium
Challenge
Corporation,
Countries,
http://www.mcc.gov/countries/index.php (demonstrating small minority of Middle
Eastern countries on the MCC's aid roster).
249.
See Lucas & Radelet, supra note 127, pt. 2 (noting that Georgia did not
pass the indicator test but that other countries that did pass the indicator test were not
selected).
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
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democratically-elected president.2 53 Although this is a noble goal, the
purpose of the MCA is to support countries with demonstrated good
governance and sound policies rather than funding new governments
as a political reward for unproven transitions to democracy. 254 The
second, and arguably more pressing concern, is that MCA funds are
now invested in a country without a sufficiently proven government
or a regulatory environment capable of ensuring those funds are
utilized appropriately. 255 The MCA could have negated this concern
to some extent by investing in governance reform programs similar to
the Threshold agreements discussed above in Part III.A.2. Instead,
Georgia's MCA Compact is comprised of infrastructure, agriculture,
and energy sector rehabilitation. 256
While these activities are
important, the MCA's ability to enact "transformative change" is
undermined by investing in the economic development of a country
without a supplemental investment in its governance and regulatory
environment.
b.

MCA Compacts

The trend in recent MCA Compacts also gives rise to political
concerns.
MCA-eligible countries develop their own Compact
proposals based on the felt priorities of the government, civil actors
and the private sector. 257 Therefore, in theory the MCC has no direct
influence in the types of Compact projects being submitted. However,
there has been extraordinary homogeneity in Compact proposals,
strongly biased towards heavy-output sectors such as manufacturing,
transportation, and agriculture. 258 The MCC itself has emphasized a
primary focus on infrastructure projects, leading eligible countries to
believe their funding chances will be greater if they submit Compact
259
proposals with strong industry and agriculture components.
Although there is substantial merit to these programs, both
independent commentators and Democrats in Congress have
criticized the MCC for this narrow focus in light of other significant
2 60
development needs in MCA-eligible countries.

253.
Id.
254.
See supra Part III.A.1.
255.
Lucas & Radelet, supra note 127, pt. 2.
256.
Millennium Challenge Compact Between the United States of America
Acting Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Government of
Georgia, U.S.-Georgia, Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://www.mcc.gov/countries/
georgia/091205GeorgiaCompact.pdf.
257.
See supra Part III.A.2.
258.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Countries, supra note 248.
259.
See Kurlantzick, supra note 30; supraPart III.C.2.
260.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 86, 90; Kurlantzick, supra note 30 (suggesting
that the MCC demonstrates a significant pro-business bias in approving MCA
Compacts).
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One of the biggest concerns raised is that MCA funds should be
going to development efforts aimed at the poorest of the poor and
should be at least partially funneled into social services such as
education and health care. 26 1 Instead, MCA funds are being invested
in sectors where capital inflows can be obtained by other sources
including loans or foreign direct investment. 26 2 Despite the obvious
merits of this argument, a case can be made for a strong focus in
Investment in infrastructure and job
industry and agriculture.
creation may create more long-term sustainable economic growththe primary goal of the MCA 263-while short-term humanitarian
crises are best handled through USAID. 264 Furthermore, agricultural
investment directly benefits all levels of society, including the most
impoverished, given the percentage of truly poor engaged in small
farming. 265 This has already been seen in the Armenia project, which
provides education and improved farming techniques to small
266
farmers, 23% of whom are women.
Most MCA experts would agree with a continued focus on
infrastructure and agriculture as the MCA has developed substantial
expertise in those areas. 26 7 However, given the MCA's goal of

261.

TARNOFF, supra note 101, at CRS-14, CRS-26; HOUT, supra note 102, at 86,

90.
262.
Kurlantzick, supra note 30; see Press Release, World Bank, World Bank
Group Directs U.S. $5.5 Billion to Overcome, Poverty, Enhance Growth in South Asia
(Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSARREGTOPINTECOTRAO,,contentMDK:21902
741-menuPK:579464-pagePK:2865114-piPK:2865167-theSitePK:579448,00.html.
263.
HOUT, supranote 102, at 19.
See USAID, Humanitarian Assistance, http://www.usaid.gov/ourworld
264.
humanitarianassistance/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (noting that USAID plays a prominent
role in humanitarian assistance).
265.
See MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., 2007 GUIDANCE FOR COMPACT
ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES, CHAPTER 22: SECTOR GUIDELINES FOR COUNTRIES PROPOSING
available
at
http://www.mcc.gov/countrytools/
AGRICULTURE
3-5
(2006),
(noting
the
compact/fy07guidance/english/22-countriesproposingagriculture.pdf
necessity of value-chain and market analysis in determining whether investment in
agriculture is appropriate). According to William Cline, seventy-five percent of the 3
billion people living on $2 per day or less live in rural or agricultural
communities. William R. Cline, The Doha Round, Agriculture, and the Developing
Countries, Remarks presented to the USDA's 83rd Agricultural Outlook Forum,
Agriculture at the Crossroads: Energy, Farm & Rural Policy 2 (Mar. 1-2, 2007),
available at http://www.usda.gov/oce/forum/2007-Speeches/PDF%20speeches/ClineW.
pdf.
266.
See MCC 2008 COUNTRY SCOREBOOK, supra note 205 (discussing Armenia's
Compact and its impact on poor female farmers); Millennium Challenge Corporation,
Armenia, http://www.mcc.gov/countries/armenialindex.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2009)
(discussing that the Compact also includes a $146 million project to increase the
productivity of approximately 250,000 farm households (34% of which are headed by
women) through improved water supply, higher yields, higher-value crops, and a more
competitive agricultural sector).
Impact Evaluation at MCC,
267.
See Millennium Challenge Corp.,
(last visited
http://www.mcc.gov/programs/impactevaluationsector-agriculture.php
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creating "transformative change," the MCC must expand the scope of
its Compact programs to support basic infrastructure development for
social welfare such as building health care facilities, computerizing
health records, or assisting with the implementation of law and policy
reforms focused on social welfare. 268 More importantly, the MCA
should shift a substantial portion of its programming focus to
improving governance, regulatory environments, and the rule of
law.

269

Regulatory reform is being undertaken indirectly through the
For instance, the MCA
agriculture and infrastructure projects.
Compact with Madagascar involves a finance project whereby the
banking sector is being substantially overhauled. 2 70 This year, a
team of financial and legal analysts will be submitting a
comprehensive banking and financial sector reform proposal to be
ratified by the Malagasy Parliament. 271 The Madagascar financial
sector reform appears to be the type of foundational regulatory reform
Both Democrats and
that the MCA should be encouraging.
Republicans can agree that improved transparency, efficiency, and
rule of law in the financial sector will directly benefit many different
aspects of Madagascar's society in the long-term. 272 However, a
closer look at the project reveals a significant pro-business bias and
raises questions as to the MCC's commitment to its true mission of
reducing poverty through growth. 27 3 Approximately one-third of the
Compact will go towards improving credit standards and assisting
financial institutions, including $21 million to help banks in
Madagascar clear checks. 2 74 Republican Tom Lantos, who voted to
authorize the MCC and was one of its earliest and most vocal
supporters laments, "Four French banks and the richest one percent
of Madagascar's elite will be the primary beneficiaries of nearly

Feb. 13, 2009) (discussing the MCC's role with supporting agriculture development and
the infrastructure needed for this development).
268.
See Two New Compacts Signed: Trend to More "Transformative" Grant
Sizes, MCA MONITOR UPDATE (Center for Global Development), Winter 2007,
for an
http://www.cgdev.org/sectiom/initiatives/-active/mcamonitor/newsletter/winterl1,
example of the emphasis on transformative change.
Nomination Hearing for John J. Danilovich to Be CEO of MCC Before the
269.
available
at
Comm.,
109th
Cong.
(2005),
S.
Foreign
Relations
http://www.mcc.gov/press/speeches/documents/testimony-092705-danilovichtosfrc.pdf
(statement of John J. Danilovich, Nominee for Chief Executive Officer of the
Millennium Challenge Corporation).
270.
Millennium Challenge Compact Between the United States of America
Acting Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Government of the
Republic of Madagascar, Annex 1, Schedule 2, U.S.-Madag., Apr. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.mcc.gov/countries/madagascar/041805MadagascarCompact.pdf.
271.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Madagascar: Compact-Eligible Country
Report (2007), http://www.mcc.gov/documents/csr-madagascar.pdf.
272.
See supra Part III.B.1.c.
See infra note 365 (describing the goals of the MCC).
273.
Kurlantzick, supra note 30.
274.
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Millennium Challenge was
twenty percent of the entire compact ....
meant to help the poor improve their plight through improved
This
economic activity, not to subsidize rich foreign banks." 275
comment by a Republican supporter of the MCA highlights just how
detrimental the MCC's obsessive pro-business focus has been to the
organization's original mission and support network.
C. Impact of a PartisanForeignAid Vehicle
Why is a partisan MCA so troublesome? Since its inception, the
MCA has enjoyed relative autonomy as an independent corporation,
allowing it to pursue core mandates largely free from political
intervention.2 7 6 Yielding to partisan interests undermines this
autonomy. There are significant problems with allowing either
party's development agenda to dominate the MCA criteria. First and
foremost, the MCA is in real danger of being labeled strictly along
partisan lines, and more specifically, along Republican lines. Many
commentators view Bush's decision to create a new foreign aid agency
rather than reforming current programs as a vote of no confidence in
USAID, a Democrat-backed program. 277 The debate as to whether
the current MCA model is becoming too focused on economic
development and capacity building for international trade-evincing
a conservative, free-market agenda-as opposed to its original
mandate of alleviating poverty through long-term sustainable growth
only give credence to such criticisms. 278 Sadly, the MCA is in real
danger of falling into the same partisan trap as USAID.
The MCA originally garnered broad bipartisan support in both
the House and the Senate, 2 79 and it simply cannot afford to lose this
With a Democrat-controlled Congress and a
bipartisan base.
Democratic president, the MCA must avoid being labeled as a
Republican initiative. According to the MCA Monitor, "the MCC
arguably has a year and [a] half to prove its model and show results
so that it survives the 2009 administration change with its model
280
intact."

Id.
275.
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006).
276.
277.
See supra Part II.D.
This classic political debate about the effectiveness of trickle-down
278.
economics is not likely to be solved by the MCA, but does raise significant issues with
the current Compact focus on infrastructure and open markets. For an excellent
critique of the MCC's current approach, see Kurlantzick, supranote 30.
Kolbe, supra note 2. In fact, one of the only true complaints about the MCA
279.
at its inception was that it did not do enough to combat the issues facing developing
countries. See id. (arguing that while the MCA is rightfully geared towards economic
development, it should make sure it benefits those outside the formal economy as well).
280.
Sarah Lucas, Lessons from Seven Countries: Reflections on the Millennium
Challenge Account, MCA MONITOR, (Center for Global Development), Apr. 2007, at 8,
available at www.cgdev.org/files/13710_file_LucasMCA.pdf.
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Despite the gravity of the threat to the MCA mission, the MCC
has been slow to strategically address or even recognize it. An
interviewer recently presented the issue to MCC CEO John
Danilovich, specifically addressing the possibility that Congress will
"pull together aid under a foreign aid czar and that the MCC will get
co-opted and lose its independence." 28 ' The interviewer said, 'You're
in the middle of that. How do you see the situation?" To which
Danilovich replied, 'Well, I don't know if we're in the middle of it.
We're sort of on the outside in a way because we are an independently
28 2
constituted organization by Congress."
However, the reality of this threat cannot be overstated. In June
2007, the CSIS-Brookings Task Force found that fifty different offices
currently manage U.S. foreign aid programs. 28 3 Lael Brainard, chair
of the Task Force, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, "The mark of a successful [foreign aid] reform will be a
reduction in the number of players within the executive branch....
Instead of the 50 separate offices that currently manage U.S. foreign
aid programs, we should have no more than one integratedagency. 28 4
Although Ms. Brainard repeatedly referenced the MCC as a
successful U.S. foreign aid organization, she nonetheless clearly
categorized the MCA as one of the fifty government agencies ripe for
consolidation.
Furthermore, the 2007 Senate Appropriations
Committee recommendation stated, "the Committee remains
concerned that compacts and country plans for MCC projects should
be coordinated with, and complementary to, other foreign assistance
28 5
efforts of the United States."
The rapidly changing political climate only serves to exacerbate
the gravity of this situation.
Although the Obama team has not
stated any intention to eliminate the MCA altogether, it has proposed
that all foreign aid initiatives, including the MCA, be conscripted
under a reorganized and empowered USAID. 28 6 This alone would not
necessarily debilitate the MCA, but would make it much more
difficult for the MCA to pursue its original apolitical objectives. The
current structure of the MCC enables it to coordinate independently
with recipient countries and maintain an aura of political
autonomy. 28 7 Although not ideal, the MCA may be able to retain its
original mission, even as a part of the larger USAID framework.
However, it must prepare for significant restructuring as a political

281.
Interview by Robert McMahon with John Danilovich, CEO, Millennium
Challenge Corp. (July 10, 2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication1i086/
danilovich.html.
282.
Id.
283.
Brainard Testimony-Reinventing Aid, supra note 123.
284.
Id.
285.
S. REP. No. 109-277, at 78 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
286.
Obama Global Development Strategy, supra note 21.
287.
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006).
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reality. In order to survive any proposed restructuring with its
original mandate intact, the MCA must begin now to separate itself
from the partisan fray and adopt an apolitical stance. This will allow
it to continue independently negotiating with developing countries in
fulfillment of its mandate of pure performance-based assistance
outside the confines of political agendas.
It will also make
Democratic leaders more sympathetic with the MCA's mission.
Lest one assume this is a pure policy debate, it is important to
note that a polarized and politicized MCA stands to have tangible
legal implications for developing countries. More important than
Washington politics, the move towards partisanship substantially
undermines and dilutes the ultimate goal of promoting an established
rule of law and rewarding good governance. It is also important to
note that this is not a critique of the Republican influence on the
initial establishment and development of the MCA nor of President
Bush's motivations. Indeed, the MCA should be touted as a positive
bipartisan achievement in an otherwise politically divisive
presidency. Aid allocation along party lines in either direction-left
or right-raises numerous issues.
A Democrat-focused MCA,
exemplified by an emphasis on Investing in People, threatens to
conflate social outcomes with objective performance indicators and
may lose sight of the long-term development goals of the MCA. A
Republican-oriented MCA, exemplified by Economic Freedom,
conversely threatens to subordinate true poverty alleviation to the
interests of financial capital markets and U.S. business interests.
The MCC must not be swayed by either side, but must remain true to
its core mission-developing long-term sustainability in countries
with stable governments and respect for the rule of law. Ruling
Justly can be seen as the only primarily bipartisan indicator, and
should become a much greater focus of both MCA eligibility and
Compact programming in order to achieve this mission.
V. SOLUTION: DEVELOPING AN APOLITICAL ENTITY WITH A

Focus ON GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
The Millennium Challenge Account concept has shown incredible
promise in the last four years but is still in serious jeopardy of having
its mission subverted by partisan interests.28 8
This would be
devastating for the many developing countries competing for MCA
Compacts and for the concept of performance-based aid in general.
The MCA must recognize its core strength of improving the rule of
law, regulatory reforms, and positive governance in developing
countries and must focus on this non-partisan mission. It must shed
current perceptions of being a purely Republican-oriented model of

288.

See supra Part IV.C.
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foreign aid and instead adopt an apolitical approach, similar to the
position taken by the World Bank. Although development is not
necessarily the primary objective of all foreign aid programs, it isand must remain-the objective of the MCA. There are numerous
other foreign aid vehicles such as USAID or the State Department
through which aid can be distributed for political expediency or
The original Millennium Challenge
national security purposes.
Account was intended to achieve aid through investment in countries
showing a dedicated commitment to economic freedom, investment in
citizens, and good governance, 28 9 and it must remain true to that
mission.
into the Obama
In order to successfully transition
Administration, the MCC should take the following steps. First, it
must reposition itself as an apolitical organization and remove any
vestiges of conservative, business-oriented control. Furthermore, it
must raise awareness within Congress and in the foreign aid
community as to previous successes and the fundamental soundness
of its core mission. Secondly, the MCA must shift its major focus
away from economic and infrastructure projects, which are more
likely to help those who can already help themselves, and focus
instead of good governance and the rule of law. This should happen
at all stages of the MCA process-indicator selection, initial
eligibility, and Compact and Threshold programs.
A. Create an Apolitical Organization
Although perceived by many to be a Republican response to the
Democrat-controlled USAID, the MCA was originally designed as a
non-partisan organization charged with allocating aid outside the
realm of either national interests or political expediency. 290 The
MCC has done a commendable job in remaining true to this mandate,
especially given the political constraints inherent in its close
relationship with Congress for funding purposes. With a few notable
exceptions, such as the questionable selection of Georgia for Compact
funding, 29 1 MCA Compact countries have seemingly been chosen
based on eligibility indicators rather than national interests. 292 In

22 U.S.C. § 7701.
289.
Id.
290.
Lucas & Radelet, supra note 127. The inclusion of Jordan for Threshold
291.
funding is another example of a questionable and politically-expedient funding
decision. Steve Radelet, MCA Monitor Blog, FY06 Threshold Countries-Some
Disturbing Choices, http:/Iblogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/archives/2005/11/fy
06_thres hold.php (Nov. 15, 2005, 18:31).
See generally Center for Global Development, MCA Monitor,
292.
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/mcamonitor (last visited Feb. 13, 2009)
(noting that independent experts from the non-partisan Center for Global Development
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fact, the MCC has been criticized for providing funds to countries
293
with no identifiable political importance to the United States.
Former U.S. Senator Bob Barr, a vocal critic of the MCA, offered this
assessment of the MCA's $66 million Compact with Vanuatu, which
he believes has "no conceivable national security value to the United
294
States":
Our Millennium Challenge Corporation Board of Directors proudly
announced in a news release last month that the tiny, but by definition
vitally important, island nation of Vanuatu (which was last known to
the U.S. military as the New Hebrides during World War II), had been
selected to receive $66 million, or more than $300 for every man,
woman and child in its population .... Thank goodness we have
thereby wrested this potential terrorist training ground from the
295
clutches of al-Qaida.

Although one might first read Mr. Barr's words to be very harsh
criticism of the MCA, they actually provide evidence that the MCC is
in fact remaining true to its mandate. However, past experience with
USAID has demonstrated how difficult it is to remain free from
296
partisan politics-difficult, but not impossible.
1.

A Model for Reform-Lessons from the World Bank

The World Bank exemplifies how aid organizations can be
structured and managed according to an apolitical development
agenda.2 97 "The World Bank's reputation is built on the premise that
it is a technically competent institution that conducts its business
without regard for politics. '2 98 In fact, the Bank's Charter specifically
prohibits any political involvement.
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of
any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the
299
political character of the member or members concerned.

This neutral political role has provided wide latitude for Bank
involvement in a number of political climates. 300 In fact, the World

continually monitoring MCA activities have found it to be largely non-partisan and
transparent in selecting candidate countries).
293.
Barr, supra note 48.
294.
Id.
295.
Id.
296.
See supra Part I.D.
297.

MICHELLE

MILLER-ADAMS,

THE

WORLD

BANK:

NEW

AGENDAS

IN A

CHANGING WORLD 100 (1999).
298.
Id.
299.
World Bank Charter art. 4(10).
300.
The World Bank currently lends to countries from every region of the globe.
The World Bank website provides a list of aid recipients. World Bank, Projects and
Operations, Country Aggregate Reports, http://web.worldbank.orgWBSITE/EXTERN
AL PROJECTS/0,,menuPK:64383817-pagePK:64387457piPK:64387543theSitePK:4
0941,00.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
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Bank has been able to gain and maintain sufficient legitimacy to
engage with governments of vastly different political complexions
30 1
only through emphasizing its technical and apolitical identity.
Paul Nelson writes, "The World Bank's apolitical posture .. .[is] a
strategy for organization survival in a highly uncertain field of
'30 2
work ...and a source of power and influence in daily operations.
Indeed, "[tihe World Bank's reputation is built on the premise that it
is a technically competent institution that conducts its business
30 3
without regard for politics."
Although the bank remains apolitical, it has become increasingly
involved in governance reform as a part of its larger mandate to
create strong governments and financial institutions capable of
effectively handling World Bank funds. 30 4 This trend originated as a
result of a 1989 World Bank report citing a "crisis of governance" in
many African countries. 30 5 The Bank originally defined governance
broadly, including such concepts as political pluralism, respect of the
rule of law, and protection of human rights.30 6
The Bank
subsequently narrowed their definition to focus on the core goal of
development and sustainable growth. 30 7 "Governance is defined as
the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a
country's economic and social resources for development. 30 8
The World Bank acknowledged the need to focus on governance
and transparency for many of the same reasons cited by proponents of
the MCA: growing concern over the effectiveness of foreign aid,
insufficient capacity to implement ambitious reform programs, and
increasing corruption which siphoned away resources from
development projects. 30 9 Numerous World Bank reports defined the

301.
PAUL J.
NELSON,
THE WORLD
BANK AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS: THE LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 118 (1995).

302.
303.

Id.
MILLER-ADAMS, supra note 297, at 100.

The governance agenda that has emerged from these institutional constraints
is a narrow, technical one that emphasizes issues of state capacity and
accountability. Observers have drawn a distinction between the "liberal
democratic" governance agenda of many bilateral aid agencies that links
democratic institutions, market-oriented economic policies and respect for
human rights, and the more limited "process of government" agenda pursued
by the World Bank that eschews mention of the form of political regime in a
borrowing country.
Id. at 102.
304.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 25, 42-43.
305.
MILLER-ADAMS, supranote 297, at 101.
306.
Id.
307.
Id.; Robert Archer, Markets and Good Government, preface (U.N. NonGovernmental Liaison Service Development Dossiers), available at http://www.unngls.org/documents/publications.en/develop.dossier/dd.O1/O1.htm.
308.

WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (1992).

309.

Id. at 101.
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310
parameters of governance and its importance in the aid realm.
Assessing Aid and the Dollar & Collier report set the foundational
groundwork for aid selectivity. 3 11 The World Bank continues to
strongly support this concept and encourages lenders to do the
The Bank's 2003 Annual Review of Development
same. 3 12
Effectiveness states that in the absence of a "relatively good policy
lending until there are
environment," donors should limit or postpone
"clear signals that reform is under way."3 13
One of the strongest points of alignment between the World
Bank and the MCA is that both have realized the strategic necessity
of tackling corruption as a threshold development issue. 314 The MCC
led in this role, but the World Bank also now closely assesses each
country's control of corruption score in determining funding
MCA
Indeed, World Bank data plays into the
allocations. 3 15
316
indicators in many levels of democracy and good governance.
Despite similarities, MCA governance efforts differ from the
World Bank in significant respects. Most of these distinctions point
to a greater competence and better alignment between governance
The MCA is better positioned
reform and the MCA mandate.
strategically and in terms of expertise to undertake more ambitious
and nebulous governance reforms. The World Bank historically
focused on tangible short-term economic development projects such as
bridges and infrastructure rather than less quantifiable and longer
term policy reforms. 317 In contrast, the MCA developed substantial
3 18
and infrastructure.
in both policy objectives
expertise
Furthermore, whereas the World Bank generally remains only
superficially involved in projects following the disbursement of
funds, 319 the MCA model includes substantial monitoring and
strategy vital to
support to ensure each project's success 32 0-a

310.
311.

See supra Part II.A.
Id.

WORLD BANK, OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP'T, 2003 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
312.
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BANK SUPPORT FOR POLICY
REFORM 13-14 (2004).

Id. at x.
313.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 92; MILLER-ADAMS, supra note 297, at 115.
314.
HOUT, supra note 102, at 92-93.
315.
FY2009 MCC INDICATORS, supra note 72, at 6-7; see supraPart III.A.1.
316.
MILLER-ADAMS, supra note 297, at 102.
317.
318.
Policy objectives through the Indicators and Threshold Programs;
infrastructure and agriculture development through MCA Compacts.
MILLER-ADAMS, supra note 297, at 102.
319.
The MCA concept includes an exhaustive reporting structure. Depending
320.
on the stage in the process, countries must submit quarterly reports regarding
Program
Implementation, and Threshold
Compact
Compact Development,
Implementation. Fact Sheet, Millennium Challenge Corp., The MCC Program Cycle
(Mar. 6, 2008), available at http://www.mcc.gov/documentslfactsheet-031408typicalprogramcycle.pdf [hereinafter MCC Program Cycle]. In addition, the MCC
reports on each Compact and Threshold program quarterly in the Federal Register and
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difficult and nebulous reform efforts such as governance and
regulatory reform.
Arguably the most important distinction between the World
Bank and the MCA is the scope of "governance," which in turn defines
the extent to which each organization can engage in governance
reform. 32 1 The MCA's concept of governance encompasses social and
political concerns whereas the World Bank focuses solely on the
technical aspects of governance as related to economic development
and free markets. 322 Most notably, the MCA approach implicitly
equates democracy with governance while the World Bank absolutely
323
forbids this approach.
Observers have drawn a distinction between the "liberal democratic"
governance agenda of many bilateral aid agencies [including the MCC]
that links democratic institutions, market-oriented economic policies
and respect for human rights, and the more limited "process of
government" agenda pursued by the World Bank that eschews mention
324
of the form of political regime in a borrowing country.

Narrowly defining governance creates a relatively limited scope
for World Bank governance reform in the context of its apolitical
agenda. According to the World Bank's legal counsel, "The Bank may
not be involved in financing legal reform activities that do not have a
direct and obvious link to economic development. '325 Most notably,
the World Bank cannot favor democracies over alternate forms of
governance. The following activities aimed at improving the legal
framework of loan recipients are within the World Bank's governance
reform mandate: support for government efforts to effectively
communicate laws; support for regulatory framework reform,
including laws governing securities markets or financial institutions;
and legal training and technical assistance to improve the judicial
systems, rule of law, and conflict resolution. 326 Governance reform
has been focused strongly on regions such as Eastern Europe and
Central Asia where the legal and institutional framework necessary
3 27
for an effective market economy is lacking.

on the MCC website, per Congressional mandate. Millennium Challenge Act of 2003,
22 U.S.C. § 7707(a).
321.
See generally HOUT, supra note 102, ch. 7 (comparing the scope of
governance in various aid selectivity metrics, including the United States and the
World Bank).
322.
MILLER-ADAMS, supra note 297, at 102.
323.
Lucas & Radelet, supranote 127.
324.
MILLER-ADAMS, supra note 297, at 102.
325.
Id. at 115.
326.
Id.
327.
Id.
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The MCA does not face these constraints and has in fact actively
embraced democracy as a key element of "good governance." 328 This
Note argues that embracing democracy as a threshold condition of aid
is entirely within the discretion of U.S. foreign policy, especially given
empirical evidence suggesting the benefits of this approach. 329 The
MCA can learn from the World Bank governance programs noted
above. In fact such programs align closely with MCA objectives, but
the MCA's broader mandate would allow it to expand this list.
Initiatives including social reform and strengthening democracies are
However, in order to
not outside the MCA's core mandate. 330
effectively implement such programs, the MCA must-like the World
Bank-maintain high standards of transparency and remain free
from either left- or right-leaning political agendas.
2.

Repositioning the MCC as an Apolitical Organization

In order to continue pursuing its core mission, the MCA must
begin to extract itself to the greatest extent possible from any type of
partisan affiliation. This will be beneficial in the short-term-to
institutionally survive an Administration change-and in the longterm-to ensure that MCA funding continues to reach the most
worthy recipients.
The MCC has already engaged in this process to some extent
through internal restructuring in October 2007 to focus its "core
activity . . . on compact implementation. '331 This Note advocates a
more proactive and aggressive strategy. In addition to internal
restructuring, the MCC must reposition itself politically as a nonpartisan organization and shed any former vestiges of Republican
control. It must return to its original, exclusive mission of facilitating
economic, social, and political progress through results-based aid in
impoverished countries with proven standards of governance, human
rights, and political freedom.
Fortunately, the MCC is strategically placed to be flexible and
has the institutional strength to withstand repositioning. The MCC

ALICIA PHILLIPS MANDAVILLE, SR. POL'Y ASsoc., MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
328.
CORPORATION, MCC AND THE LONG TERM GOAL OF DEEPENING DEMOCRACY 1 (2007),

available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc- 112007-paper-democracy.pdf.
See supra Part III.B.1 (noting empirical and anecdotal successes of the
329.
MCA Effect and Compact programs). Despite an implicit acceptance of democracy, the
MCA remains reluctant to explicitly use this term. As Elizabeth Spiro Clark notes,
"[gliven that the MCA was developed in the Treasury Department, it is no surprise
that it reflects the World Bank's reluctance to use the "D" word." Elizabeth Spiro
Clark, The Millennium Challenge Account: Spur to Democracy?, Foreign Serv. J., Apr.
2005, at 31, 33.
330.
MCC Program Cycle, supra note 320.
Announces
MCC
Corp.,
Challenge
Millennium
331.
Press Release,
Reorganization to Focus Agency on Compact Implementation (Oct. 1, 2007), available
at http://www.mcc.gov/press/releases/documents/release- 100 107-reorganization.php.
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has often been praised for its internal culture.3 32 It was recently
selected as one of the five best government agencies to work for,
scoring 83.3 for "Employee Skills/Mission Match" and 74.7 for
"Teamwork. '333
Its small and independent structure gives it
significant autonomy in organizational form and direction.
Furthermore, U.S. government agencies have successfully made this
transition in the past.3 3 4 In developing a nonpartisan and apolitical
stance, the MCC would benefit from the lessons learned by
AmeriCorps
in transitioning
from the Clinton to Bush
administrations. At the end of his term, Clinton had one mission, "to
take [AmeriCorps] off the partisan political battlefield. 3 3 5
He
accomplished this mission by first vowing to remove AmeriCorps from
any political campaigns and to ensure that key AmeriCorps leaders
were not involved in partisan politics. 3 3 6
AmeriCorps then
collaborated with non-profit advocacy groups from both sides of the
political spectrum, achieved key relationships with the new Bush
Administration, and finally convinced Congress through action rather
3 37
than words that its nonpartisan stance was genuine.
The MCC can affect the same transformation.
Although
commentators on the extremes have called the MCA concept simply
an expansion of "American imperialism" and "neo-conservative
definitions of democracy and freedom," most international aid
advocates view the underlying mission of results-based aid in the
MCA as a legitimate and noble goal.3 38 Similar to AmeriCorps, the
MCC should capitalize on this broad support by embracing nonpartisanship; it can then educate constituents about its nonpartisan
stance and collaborate with organizations able to reinforce this
position.
At the core of developing a nonpartisan approach must be a
fundamental shift in the stance of the MCA coupled with prominent
outward manifestations of this new direction. For instance, the MCC
should lobby Congress to remove most MCA positions from the realm
of political appointments. They should also seek to realign the Board
to be apolitical and non-partisan. Finally, staggering any political

332.
See, e.g., Brainard Testimony-Reinventing Aid, supra note 123
(commending the MCA for its effective workplace environment).
333.
The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government 2007, Millennium
Challegne Corporation, available at http://www.bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/
agency.php?code=MIOO&q=scoressmall (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
334.
Harris Wofford, The Politics of Service: How a Nation Got Behind
Americorps, BROOKINGS REV., Sept. 22, 2002, available at http://www.brookings.edul
articles/2002/fallcivilsociety-wofford.aspx.
335.
Id.
336.
Id.
337.
Id.
338.
See Soederberg, supra note 12, abstract (explaining that though the MCC
has imperialistic overtones, its goals are meritable).
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appointments will create consistency in the MCA's top management
despite partisan power. A deeper analysis of steps to becoming
apolitical in an admittedly political field is outside the scope of this
discussion. However, it must be the focus of any future action taken
by the MCC Board if the MCA hopes to survive through the next
administration.
Importantly, the MCC must capitalize on its successes and on its
shift towards a non-partisan approach by using its allies to support
its cause. The MCA has demonstrated measurable successes on an
individual Compact-country basis and more broadly through
innovative programming strategies and the MCA Effect. 339 However,
as Sarah Lucas noted in the April 2007 MCA Monitor, "the MCA has
not done a particularly good job of making the case for its
'340
approach.
The MCA should "make this case" by actively communicating its
successes and maintaining its broad constituency in Washington,
D.C., and in the larger foreign aid community. 341 It is also vital that
the MCA communicate the importance of its aid selection
methodology. As evidenced by the FY2009 Senate Appropriations
Committee report-in which the Committee essentially recommended
a "life support" budget for the MCA 34 2-many Congressmen hold
dangerous misconceptions about the MCA's strategy of long-term,
sustainable
development.
The Appropriations
Committee
recommended a FY2009 budget of $254 million, $1.97 billion below
the MCC's budget request. 34 3 The Committee then recommended
reallocating the additional $1.97 billion "to support programs . . . to
address immediate and pressing humanitarian, development, and
security needs. '344
Although funding humanitarian needs is
commendable, the Committee's comments make it clear that they
prefer a compassion- or crisis-based aid approach and have not yet
been convinced of the benefits of performance-based aid to generate
345
long-term growth.
Even more alarming, the Appropriations Committee actually
criticized the MCA for basing country selections on performance

339.
See supraPart IVA.
340.
Lucas, supra note 280, at 2.
341.
"The [MCC] should let the voices of its greatest advocates-MCA country
teams, NGOs and beneficiaries-be heard more loudly in Washington. They would do
a lot to help build a D.C. constituency of support." Id. at 5-6.
342.
FY2009 SEN. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., supra note 9, at 61-62; Herrling
Post, supra note 20.
343.
FY2009 SEN. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., supra note 9, at 61.
344.
Id.
345.
"While recognizing the development impact of child survival and HIV/AIDS
programs, simultaneously cutting the complementary long-term MCC funding that
builds economies to provide jobs and security for those individuals saved and could
build health systems more broadly is ultimately short-sighted." Herrling Post, supra
note 20.
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The Committee report
indicators instead of political interests.
concluded with: "[T]he Committee underscores its strong support for
additional assistance for countries important to U.S. interests. The
Committee expects that should the MCC reprogram existing funds for
new compacts, priority will be given to such countries.'346 This
statement marks a devastating blow to the MCA concept and 34to7
developing countries struggling to meet MCA eligibility indicators.
Rather than rewarding countries based on good governance, sound
economic policies, and investment in their people, the Senate
Appropriations Committee is once again expressing intent to use
foreign aid for purposes of political expediency. The MCA must
actively resist this trend or risk undermining all of the progress that
has been made to date through the MCA Effect and Threshold and
Compact programs. "The MCA program will lose value-and
effectiveness-to the extent that publics in recipient countries
348
identify it not with development goals but with U.S. foreign policy."
The Senate Appropriations Committee recommendations have
349
been generally regarded as a near fatal blow to the MCA.
However, this "life support" year may actually be good for the MCC.
By taking a step back from new Compact development, the MCA can
focus on repositioning and redirecting resources towards its original
mission. It can also use this time to rebuild its support system within
Washington, D.C., and develop new supporters in the incoming
Administration. As Kurlantzick writes,
Even leading conservatives who initially supported the program are
"The great promise of the Millennium
now blasting the MCC.
Challenge was met with tremendous hope and anticipation," said Rep.
Henry Hyde, who voted to authorize the initiative as chairman of the
House International Relations Committee. But now, he said, "we see a
program struggling to get off the ground . . . lacking the boldness
necessary to break the cycle of poverty"-a failure that belies the
3 50
original vision.

Realignment as an apolitical entity alone will not save the MCA.
However, by removing itself from partisan politics, the MCA will be
able to focus more directly on educating constituents and garnering
support from both sides of the aisle. If the Democrats no longer see
the MCA as a Republican vehicle for opening markets to trade, but
rather as a means of encouraging democracy and the rule of law,

346.
FY2009 SEN. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., supra note 9, at 63 (emphasis
added).
347.
"Any language that suggests the MCC should reprogram assistance to
'countries important to U.S. interests' takes the poverty focus of the MCC political,
thereby casting doubt on the degree of real support for the model." Herrling Post, supra
note 20.
348.
Clark, supranote 329, at 35.
Herrling Post, supra note 20.
349.
350.
Kurlantzick, supra note 30.
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there is a much greater probability of the continued existence of the
MCA concept.
B. Focus on Good Governance and the Rule of Law
1.

Focus on Governance Indicators

The MCC has developed a novel approach of performance-based
aid and has proven the viability of its underlying concept. Empirical
studies such as the Harvard Report as well as testimonial evidence
from developing countries demonstrate the effectiveness of
performance-driven assistance. Ruling Justly indicators such as rule
of law and governance metrics remain the most apolitical method for
measuring the performance of developing countries. The MCA should
focus the majority of its efforts in refining eligibility indicators in
these areas.
The MCA must use its unique position of influence to encourage
and strengthen both democracy and good governance in the
developing world. Democracy gives individuals a voice through
representative governments. 351 Governance rather focuses on fair
and consistent application of the law, restraint on corruption, and
transparent and accountable government. 35 2 The MCA must focus on
both to create the most fair and effective indicator metrics.
Even economic and social indicators should encompass tangible
human and socio-economic rights.
For instance, in addition to
measuring girls' primary education, which may be influenced by a
number of means such as cultural or family constraints, the Investing
in People pillar might introduce an indicator pertaining more broadly
to the protection of women's rights through laws and enforcement
mechanisms. Lesotho's enactment of the "Legal Capacity of Married
Persons Act" provides strong support for the proposition that
developing countries would respond well to this indicator and take
active steps to improve the status of women. 353 Furthermore, there
are objective and measurable methods for assessing women's rights in
developing countries.
Factors such as the number of women in
decision making positions, enforcement of laws and policies protecting
victims of gender-based violence, and percentage of women with
access to basic resources are already tracked in most developing
countries in response to international agreements like the Convention

351.
LAEL BRAINARD, SECURITY BY OTHER MEANS: FOREIGN ASSISTANCE,
GLOBAL POVERTY, AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 14 (2006). Although democracy

generally cannot be forced, it can be encouraged and rewarded through aid and other
incentives. Id.
352.
Id.
353.
See S. Res. 103, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110cong-bills&docid=f:sr103ats.txt.pdf.
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on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). 354 Creating incentives for countries to put good laws on
the books is not in and of itself sufficient to change the legal
environment. However, coupled with MCA Compact components
aimed at improving the public awareness and enforcement of laws,
policies changed through the MCA Effect could have real impact.
2.

Encourage Governance and the Rule of Law in MCA Compacts

The MCA has recently recognized the importance of democracy
and the rule of law, stating, "We are acting consciously on the belief
that democracy and economic development are not competing aims,
but rather fully complimentary objectives. '' 35 5 However, the MCA
primarily encourages democracy primarily by allowing country
ownership in Compact development and implementation. 356 While
this is a positive step, it is insufficient without MCA Compacts
designed to strengthen the institutional and legal framework of
Compact countries.
Several reasons make good governance a necessary focus of MCA
Compacts. The MCC was precipitated on growing international
research recognizing that aid works best in countries with sound
governance and policies. 357 Indeed, President Bush explicitly stated
this in his introduction of the MCA. 35 8 Further, it appears that the
MCC values governance as the most important eligibility indicator,
evidenced by the absolute control of corruption hurdle and the de
facto democracy hurdle minimums. Finally, Ruling Justly is arguably
the only pillar almost entirely free from substantial partisan
interests. Both Republicans and Democrats can agree that a
transparent, fair, and effective government with a strong rule of law
and limited corruption is vital to long-term sustainable development
in the poorest countries. Unfortunately, the Harvard Study provides
empirical evidence suggesting that MCA eligible countries are
improving almost every indicator except for the key governance and
rule of law indicators and are in fact showing slightly negative trends

354. See U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women [CEDAW] art. 18, G.A. Res. 34/180, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180
(Dec. 18, 1979) (outlining CEDAW reporting requirement regarding women's rights
issues); U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women, Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff.,
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], State Parties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2009) (listing signatories to CEDAW).
355. MANDAVILLE, supra note 328, at iii.
356. Id. at ii.
357. See supra Part II.A (describing research that suggested a results-based
approach to foreign aid).
358. Bush, supranote 42.
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in these indicators. 359 The evidence suggesting that the MCA Effect
is not sufficiently robust to encourage improvement in the Ruling
Justly indicators presents a compelling case for a greater MCC focus
on governance reform in Compact and Threshold program
development.
Although there is strength in the current MCA strategy of
allowing Compact-eligible countries to identify their own funding
priorities, this must be balanced with the overall U.S. foreign aid
policy of improving governance and regulatory reform in emerging
markets. The MCC has developed relevant expertise in governance
reform programs through drafting and implementing Threshold
programs focused on improving governance, controlling corruption,
and strengthening the rule of law. 360
This broad catalog of
governance reform initiatives such as reforming the judicial process,
enhancing election processes, and creating government accountability
programs can be effectively translated into more sophisticated
programs for Compact-eligible countries.
While the immediate relevance of judicial reform and governance
programs is apparent, the role of the MCA in other types of legal
reforms is less clear.
Many Congressmen and human rights
organizations have called for a greater emphasis on social welfare
and human rights reform programs. 361 However, the goal of the MCA
is to "reduce poverty through economic growth" and to create
sustainable economies capable of subsequently investing in their own
social welfare. 362 While some social welfare initiatives, such as
women's right to own property, have implications for economic and
governance reform, the MCA has rejected getting heavily involved in
other programs not directly related to economic/infrastructure
development or governance-policy reform. This is demonstrated by
the fact that only two primary education programs are listed in the
363
success stories section of the MCC website.
Although unpopular with human rights organizers and NGOs,
the strategic decision to relegate these programs to other aid
programs such as USAID or PEPFAR (President Bush's HIV/AIDS
364
treatment initiative) is in fact consistent with the MCA's mission.

359.
Johnson & Zajonc, supranote 22, tbl.1.
360.
See supraPart IV.A.2.
361.
TARNOFF, supra note 101, at CRS-4--CRS-5.
362.
MCC Makes Headway, supra note 195.
363.
Burkina Faso and Ghana have both improved access to primary education
for girls through MCA funding. Success Stories, supra note 154.
364.
A key strategy of the MCA is "reducing poverty through economic growth."
Millennium Challenge Corporation, About MCC, supra note 91 ('The MCC focuses
specifically on promoting sustainable economic growth to reduce poverty through
investments in areas such as transportation, water and industrial infrastructure,
agriculture, education, private sector development, and capacity building."); see also
Lael Brainard, Compassionate Conservatism Confronts Global Poverty, WASH. Q.,
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The World Bank has faced similar criticisms in many of its
programs. 36 5 "NGOs criticize the Bank's work on governance as
partial and one-sided, concerned mainly with the creation of a
favorable investment climate and driven by the needs and concerns of
'366
private sector actors, rather than civil society as a whole.
While these are legitimate concerns, the MCA, like the World
Bank, must remain true to its mission and long-term strategic plan.
Social welfare programs are not specifically within the mandate of
the MCA and can be more capably and efficiently implemented by
USAID. However, a call for the MCA to remain true to its original
mission is by no means an endorsement of the MCC's current probusiness focus. Many MCA Compacts as currently administered
subvert the goals of poverty reduction to the interests of free markets,
big business, and international trade. At the moment, the MCA
model appears to be on "life support"-both financially and
programmatically-but it is not dead. Shifting the MCA's focus away
from big business and towards governance reforms, democracy
building, and improving the rule of law is vital to regaining the
MCA's credibility and giving credence to this novel international aid
experiment.
Compact and Threshold programs focused on democracy and the
rule of law will eventually build the institutional capacity necessary
for tackling larger human rights reforms and far-reaching
development efforts.
Successful economies, in the absence of
transparent and accountable governments, create incentives for
corruption and greed. One need only look at the current situation in
Zimbabwe-once the "Jewel of Africa"-to see the effects of economic
36 7
prosperity in the absence of a solid rule of law.

Spring 2003, at 149, 156 ("Unlike the existing USAID Development Assistance and
Child Survival and Health funds, which are allocated to countries whose development
needs are most compelling, the MCA would attempt to isolate the highest potential
investments by targeting only the best performing poor countries.").
365.
MILLER-ADAMs, supra note 297, at 103.
366.
Id.
367.
Club of Rome, What Happened to the Jewel of Africa? Political Debacle in
Zimbabwe, http://clubofrome.wordpress.com/2005/02/05/what-happened-to-the-jewel-ofafrica-political-debacle-in-zimbabwe-salon-on-february-5th-2005/ (Feb. 5, 2005). The
poster writes:
Zimbabwe was once viewed as a model for African economic management ....
However, a combination of repression, mismanagement (a schizophrenic
gyration between state controls and neoliberal policy), and corruption have
brought the nation to hunger, hyper-inflation, political paralysis (including
jeopardizing the independence of the judiciary and press) and the verge of mass
civil disobedience.

682

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL, 42.:621

VI. CONCLUSION

Although many see the Millennium Challenge Account as a pure
policy initiative driven primarily by conservative interests, anecdotal
and empirical evidence conclusively proves that the MCA positively
impacts developing countries both through the MCA Effect and
through Compact and Threshold programs. More importantly, the
MCA is directly influencing candidate countries to make tangible
improvements in governance, transparency, regulatory environments,
and the rule of law. This presents an incredible opportunity to prove
the effectiveness of results-based foreign aid. It also presents a very
real danger of partisan politics compromising the integrity of the
MCA concept. Early evidence of a partisan influence can be seen in
the emphasis on Economic Freedom indicators as well as an
increasing homogeneity in MCA Compact programs focusing on
Furthermore, by
infrastructure and free market development.
autonomy and
losing
its
the
MCA
risks
playing to partisan interests,
being manipulated by both Republicans and Democrats for purposes
of political expediency.
In order to combat this threat, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation must adopt a consistent, nonpartisan, and empiricallysound approach to determining eligibility indicators and aid
distribution. Removing the MCA substantially from the political
arena and shifting the primary focus of the MCA to democracy and
the rule of law will greatly increase the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
aid in creating lasting governance and policy reform in developing
nations.
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